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We live in a “datafied” society in which our personal 
data is constantly harvested, analyzed, and sold by 
governments and businesses. Algorithms analyze 
this data, sort people into categories, and serve as 
gatekeepers to life’s necessities. Yet people remain 
largely in the dark about these big data systems, 
creating an informational asymmetry whose harmful 
consequences fall most harshly on low-income people. 
Data-centric technologies add scope, scale, and speed 
to negative inferences about poor people. Based 
on their digital profiles, they can find themselves 
excluded from mainstream opportunities, such as 
jobs, education, and housing; targeted for predatory 
services and products; and surveilled by systems 
in their neighborhoods, workplaces, and schools. 
The technological systems impacting low-income 
communities raise profound issues of civil rights,  
human rights, and economic justice.
As a result, civil legal services (or poverty) lawyers 
increasingly represent clients whose legal challenges 
are intertwined with automated decision-making 
systems, digital profiling, predictive analytics, and 
various artificial intelligence tools. Competent legal 
representation requires an ability to issue-spot  
the ways in which data-centric technologies intersect 
with legal claims and defenses and to understand 
governing legal frameworks. At the same time, lawyers 
do not need the technical expertise of computer 
scientists to effectively interrogate these systems. 
Rather, understanding where and how data-centric 
technologies operate puts lawyers in a powerful 
position to advocate alongside their clients. 
This report is designed to help poverty lawyers and 
their clients resist the adverse impacts of data-centric 
technologies and to engage as stakeholders in the 
adoption and implementation of algorithmic systems. 
The report is organized by major practice area and 
includes links to helpful resources for deeper dives 
into specific issues that may arise in legal services 
representation and policy advocacy. The practice 
areas covered are consumer, family law, housing, 
public benefits, schools and education, and workers’ 
rights, as well as a final section on how immigration 
surveillance intersects with these practice areas. 
The report aims to assist legal services attorneys in 
identifying the impacts that existing and emerging 
technologies have on their clients. It does not cover  
the myriad ways attorneys and scholars have 
challenged algorithmic systems in the criminal justice 
system, although it is deeply indebted to their insights.
PREFACE
“Data-centric technologies  
add scope, scale, and speed to  
negative inferences about  
poor people.”
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● DEFINITIONS
Before delving into substantive practice areas,  
some core definitions are essential to understanding 
the data-centric technologies that impact legal 
services clients.
An algorithm is a set of well-defined instructions, 
especially for use by a computer. In the context of 
automated decision-making, an algorithm is the set 
of instructions that tells a computer how to complete 
a prespecified task. Automated decision-making is 
a way to divide complex decisions into discrete tasks 
that a computer algorithm or set of algorithms can 
perform on digital data.
Algorithms can range from the very simple to the very 
complex. Some algorithms are rule based, meaning 
the problem space and potential solutions are discrete 
and predefined. The computer does exactly what the 
programmer asks it to do. A food stamp calculator is an 
example of this type of algorithm.
Other algorithms are used in machine learning, which 
may or may not be rule based. “Machine learning” refers 
to a broad range of algorithmic techniques, including 
simple statistical analyses as well as cutting-edge 
techniques known as “deep learning” or “neural 
networks.” In the most basic sense, machine learning 
is an automated process in which a computer analyzes 
large sets of data to discover correlations in existing 
data, which can then be used to make predictions 
about future behavior. All but the most advanced forms 
of machine learning rely on prespecified models to 
analyze the data. While designers of machine learning 
systems can’t necessarily specify or even predict 
every outcome, the system’s overall performance is 
very much shaped by designers—from the datasets 
and models used to the selection of tasks and 
goals the algorithms are addressing. When Netflix 
recommends certain movies to viewers, it is making 
these predictions based on a form of machine learning. 
Certain fraud detection systems in public benefits 
regimes also rely on machine learning to identify 
suspicious patterns within data sets. Machine learning 
is one type of artificial intelligence (AI). AI is a broad 
category of technologies that attempts to approximate 
human intelligence.
Digital profiling is the automated processing of 
personal data in order to evaluate people and/or to 
predict their behavior. Algorithms are used in profiling. 
A credit score is an example of profiling, as is a tenant 
screening report. 
● GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Six overarching principles pertain to all civil practice 
areas. The first is that digital technologies are 
impacting legal services clients. Unfortunately, 
many lawyers and their clients are unaware of these 
automated decision-making systems. An informal, 
national survey of legal services lawyers and staff 
found that 0% of respondents believed that automated 
systems or AI was “very frequently” used in benefits 
applications, while 45% were unsure whether their 
clients were subject to automated decision-making. 
The actual rate of automated eligibility determinations 
in benefits systems is much higher, if not 100%. This 
is because automated systems are used in all states 
Foundational  Concepts
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to determine public benefits eligibility and to maintain 
data on applicants, and the vast majority of low-income 
people interact with government assistance programs.
Many automated decision-making systems operate 
invisibly and without opportunities for public input. 
An applicant for rental housing, for instance, may 
be denied based on an algorithmic determination in 
a tenant screening report yet never learn about the 
basis of the denial. In addition, governments regularly 
adopt automated decision-making systems without 
public knowledge or input. For many years, a sharp 
digital divide between poor people and more affluent 
Americans meant that wealth determined access  
to computers and the internet.  However, that divide 
is narrowing, largely due to increased smartphone 
access. At the same time, businesses and government  
have become vastly ore sophisticated in monetizing 
and utilizing personal data. Thus, lawyers who  
learn to look for these issues will begin to see them 
throughout their dockets.
Second, lawyers need to understand that computers 
are not magic.1 It is tempting to put faith in 
computers given the biases and errors associated 
with human decision-making. In contrast to humans, 
computers appear objective and accurate. However, 
people program computers and import human biases 
and errors into computer models, thus, the computer 
science saying, “garbage in, garbage out.” As author 
and math professor Hannah Fry states, “Algorithms 
are a lot like magical illusions. At first they appear 
to be nothing short of wizardry, but as soon as you 
know how the trick is done, the mystery evaporates.”2 
Poverty lawyers must understand how systems use 
algorithms in ways that can harm clients.
1  M.C. Elish & danah boyd (2018), Situating Methods in the Magic of Big Data 
and AI, Communication Monographs 85:1, 57, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/03637751.2017.1375130?needAccess=true&journalCode=rcmm20.
2 Hannah Fry, Don't Believe the Algorithm, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-
believe-the-algorithm-1536157620.
3  Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249 (2008).
In creating an algorithm, developers exercise human 
judgment at numerous points. People determine and 
define the algorithm’s goals and desired outputs; 
they identify, collect, and clean the data that feeds 
the models; they select and apply an algorithmic 
model; they screen results for errors and outliers and 
tweak the model accordingly; they set the acceptable 
levels of false negatives and false positives; and they 
interpret a model’s outcomes. Mistakes and biases can 
be incorporated at any and all of these stages.
For instance, the data that algorithms analyze can 
contain errors. Any lawyer who has reviewed a credit 
report with a client has seen the range of errors and 
omissions that can be baked into a credit score, which 
is a type of algorithmic output. In the unregulated data 
broker industry, errors are even higher, typically no 
more accurate than a coin toss. Data, or information, 
brokers are companies that scrape personal data 
from multiple sources, aggregate the data to create 
personalized digital profiles, and sell the profiles to  
a variety of industries and government agencies.
Mistakes also arise when programmers inaccurately 
translate regulatory requirements into source code—
an outcome that won’t surprise lawyers who regularly 
wrestle with complex and ambiguous regulations in 
fields such as public benefits, the environment, or tax. 
Millions of Americans have lost access to desperately 
needed public benefits as a result of coding errors.3 
In addition, some concepts regularly embedded into 
law, such as reasonable, necessary, and credible, 
require human judgment and are thus difficult, if not 
impossible, to translate into code.
Foundational  Concepts
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Another reason for caution is that data is not neutral. 
Data sets reflect structural inequities, which in turn 
can result in digital discrimination against marginalized 
groups.4 Just as rotten eggs will spoil a recipe, bad 
or incomplete data spoils algorithmic outcomes. For 
instance, a commercial health care algorithm was 
identifying white patients for more intensive medical 
care than similarly ill Black patients.5 The algorithm 
was shown to rely on data about past health care 
expenditures to make predictions about patients’ 
future needs. As health care lawyers are well aware, 
African Americans suffer numerous logistical, 
institutional, and cultural barriers to health care 
access and thus have lower cost histories. When 
researchers reformulated the algorithm to eliminate 
past expenditures as a proxy for needs, the racial bias 
disappeared. These sorts of structural biases along 
class, race, and gender lines are endemic in the data 
that gets fed into algorithmic systems, thereby yielding 
unequal outcomes.
Third, despite the fallibility of algorithms, lawyers 
may confront judges, juries, and other decision-
makers inflicted with automation bias. This is a 
psychological phenomenon in which people defer to 
computer-generated outputs as more reliable than 
their own judgment.6 In one study, the vast majority 
of participants who believed they were in a room on 
4  Center for Democracy and Technology, AI and Machine Learning. For an overview of the ways big data can 
harm marginalized communities, see Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy, & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty and 
Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 Wash U. L. Rev. 53 (2017). 
5  Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations, 
Science, Oct. 25, 2019, https://science.sciencemag.org/content/366/6464/447. 
6  L.J. Skitka, K.L. Mosier, & M. Burdick, Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?, 51 Int’l J. of Human-Computer 
Studies, 991 (1999)..
7  Aviva Rutkin, People Will Follow a Robot in an Emergency – Even if It’s Wrong, New Scientist, Feb. 29, 2016, 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2078945-people-will-follow-a-robot-in-an-emergency-even-if-its-wrong.
8  Angéle Christin, Algorithms in Practice: Comparing Web Journalism and Criminal Justice, Big Data & Society 1 
(July–Dec. 2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951717718855.
9  Results have been more mixed in criminal cases. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: 
Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stanford L. Rev. 1343 (2018).
fire followed instructions from a robot pointing to an 
obscured route rather than taking clearly marked exits.7 
In the justice system, the concern is that judges and 
juries will yield to algorithmic determinations without 
adequate context or skepticism. Alternatively, lawyers 
and judges may be skeptical of algorithms but still 
use these data-centric tools to mask their subjective 
decision-making, “burying them under a patina of 
objectivity and making them harder to monitor.”8 
In either situation, poverty lawyers need the tools 
to understand why algorithms can be incorrect, to 
access and interrogate algorithmic models, and to 
explain to judges and other decision-makers why they 
should neither blindly trust nor completely reject an 
algorithmic determination.
Fourth, in challenging algorithms in adversarial 
proceedings, poverty lawyers are likely to face claims 
that the algorithm is proprietary. Under state laws, 
businesses gain trade secret protection for nonpublic 
information that gives them a competitive advantage 
if they take reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. 
Further, many government agencies that purchase 
algorithmic software from private vendors do so under 
contractual, nondisclosure agreements. Nevertheless, 
in the civil context,9 courts have ruled that procedural 
due process interests prevail over trade secrecy claims 
in cases involving algorithms that determined Medicaid 
Foundational  Concepts
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care levels10 and teacher performance ratings.11 This is 
a new and evolving area of the law.
Other levers for algorithmic disclosure are also 
possible, particularly where government agencies 
are using algorithms in decision-making. Freedom of 
information laws can be used to request where and 
how government agencies use algorithms, as well as 
to seek information about how the models operate, 
although the scope of statutory exceptions remains in 
flux and is likely to be litigated in coming years.12
Another route for disclosure is to monitor state 
and local procurement processes as governments 
purchase algorithmic tools for carrying out government 
services.13 In addition, poverty lawyers and their 
clients can advocate for legislation to improve 
transparency around the adoption of automated 
decision-making systems. For instance, Washington 
State is considering an algorithmic accountability 
law that would establish procurement guidelines 
for automated decision-making systems; New York 
City adopted an algorithmic accountability law that 
created a task force to issue recommendations for 
city purchase and use of algorithms; and Seattle 
requires public disclosure, community engagement, 
and ongoing reporting when surveillance systems are 
purchased. These transparency efforts and others 
emerging across the country provide templates for 
consideration in other jurisdictions.
10  K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703 (D. Idaho 2016).
11  Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1175–80 (S.D. Tex. 
2017). The Court explained that the developer’s “trade secrets do not empower, much less compel, [the school 
district] to violate the constitutional rights of its employees.” Id. at 1179. 
12  See Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 Yale J. L. & Tech. 
103 (2018); Hannah Bloch-Webha, Access to Algorithms, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 1265 (2020); Algorithmic Accountability 
Policy Toolkit, AI Now Institute (Oct. 2018), (including a model public information act request).
13  Id. at 11 (including model procurement language).
Fifth, poverty lawyers do not need a technical 
background or the ability to code software in order 
to effectively advocate in cases involving data-
centric technologies. These emerging issues are 
no more complex than other interdisciplinary areas 
that poverty lawyers regularly have to master to 
effectively represent clients, such as the health 
effects of lead paint and remediation requirements, 
permissible credit financing structures under federal 
and state lending laws, and the feasible educational 
and therapeutic strategies for students receiving 
special education services. With regard to data-
centric technologies, there are many available 
resources (including those linked in this report) and 
experienced lawyers who have challenged algorithmic 
systems and can provide guidance. Moreover, by 
gaining the skills to issue spot digital privacy issues, 
lawyers will be well situated to connect with technical 
experts where necessary.
Finally, while outside the scope of this report, 
technology is bringing many benefits to low-income 
people, legal services practices, and the justice 
system. Internet access gives low-income people the 
ability to apply for jobs or services and to connect 
with social justice movements with ease. Antipoverty 
advocates have developed tech tools to empower 
low-income communities, such as smartphone apps 
that keep track of hours worked for purposes of 
wage claims, automatically complete expungement 
petitions, and provide pro se legal advice. They have 
also analyzed open data, such as eviction data, to 
understand outcomes and advocate for systemic 
Foundational  Concepts
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change. The legal services community is considering 
how to use technology to improve legal representation 
and the justice system. Continued innovations may 
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Consumer lawyers regularly 
assist clients with the 
consequences of credit and 
consumer reports, which are 
based on digital scraping of 
personal data. These reports 
determine access to housing, 
jobs, and education. Technology 
is also reshaping the debt 
collection industry and making 
it easier to target and exploit 
vulnerable consumers.




Consumer reporting agencies, data brokers, internet 
platforms, digital advertising companies, and other 
businesses are making millions of dollars compiling 
and selling consumers’ digital profiles.14 Personal 
data is gathered from a multitude of sources, 
including public records, web browsing activity, 
emails, banking activity, social media, store loyalty 
cards, online quizzes, license-plate readers, app 
usage, smart devices (such as fitness watches 
and internet-connected doorbells), and geolocation 
tracking on smartphones. Personal profiles are also 
shaped by data pulled from their online networks; in 
other words, they are judged by their social media 
friends. From all this data, businesses glean people’s 
buying habits, social relationships, creditworthiness, 
political preferences, lifestyle, hobbies, health, and 
personality—and even make predictions about their 
future behavior. These networks of data extraction 
lack transparency and accountability and raise the 
risks of digital discrimination and inaccuracy.
Consumer reports are nothing new; they have been 
assembled for decades as a way of assessing a 
consumer’s creditworthiness. However, the scope and 
scale of today’s data markets are much vaster, much 
faster, and more granular. The dangers for low-income 
people arise because digital profiles often operate as 
gatekeepers to affordable credit, jobs, employment, 
education, insurance, health care, and other life 
Consumer Law
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necessities. They are also used to target low-income 
people with predatory marketing schemes, such as 
payday loans and for-profit educational scams.
For people living on the economic margins, credit 
reports can be economically devastating because, as 
consumer attorney Chi Chi Wu has stated, they penalize 
“consumers who have fallen on hard times through no 
fault of their own—from illness, job loss, victims of 
fraud, or victims of natural disasters, treating them 
as irresponsible deadbeats.”15 These consumers can 
find themselves in a vicious cycle in which their failure 
to pay a bill becomes encoded in their digital profile, 
which in turn makes it difficult to get a job or pay rent, 
which in turn worsens their hope of paying their bills 
15  Testimony of Chi Chi Wu, National Consumer Law Center, before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. 
on Financial Svcs., “Who’s Keeping Score? Holding Credit Bureaus Accountable and Repairing a Broken System” (Feb. 
26, 2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/testimony-hfsc-credit-reporting-hearing.pdf.
16  Chi Chi Wu, Solving the Credit Conundrum: Helping Consumers' Credit Records Impaired by the Foreclosure 
Crisis and Great Recession, National Consumer Law Center (Dec. 2013), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_
reports/report-credit-conundrum-2013.pdf. 
17  National Consumer Law Center, Past Imperfect: How Credit Scores and Other Analytics “Bake In” Past 
Discrimination and Perpetuate It (May 2016), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_discrimination/Past_
Imperfect050616.pdf.
18  Testimony of Wu, supra note 15, at 9–10.
19  Id.; see also Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders' Use of Big Data, 93  
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3, 18–29 (2018).
20  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x.
and improving their credit standing.16 These cycles fall 
most harshly on communities of color, due to structural 
disadvantages in the economy.17
At the other extreme of the data extraction spectrum, 
44 million people are “credit invisible” because they are 
disconnected from mainstream financial services and 
thus do not have a credit history. For these consumers, 
credit reporting agencies and the financial technology 
industry are exploring using alternative data points 
for scoring, such as rental payment history, utility 
payments, or bank account information. Some of these 
alternatives are likely helpful to low-income consumers, 
while others will prove harmful.18 The devil is in the 
details and thus will require careful attention from and 
involvement of consumer attorneys.19
The primary statute governing consumer reporting is 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).20 Under FCRA, 
consumer reporting agencies (CRA) must adopt 
reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of the 
information they report. CRAs include the big three 
credit bureaus: Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion. 
These are private companies beholden to shareholders 
and whose customers are primarily creditors and debt 
collectors; thus, the interests of low-income consumers 
“The dangers for low-income  
people arise because digital  
profiles often operate as  
gatekeepers to affordable  
credit, jobs, employment,  
education, insurance, health 
care, and other life necessities.” 
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are not part of their business model.21 (For this reason, 
some advocates have called for establishing a public 
credit registry.22)
According to the FCRA, CRAs also include any entities 
that prepare reports that bear “on a consumer’s 
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, 
or mode of living” and are used for purposes of credit, 
insurance, or employment, and certain other eligibility 
determinations. Employment and tenant screening 
companies, then, are CRAs, while digital profiles used 
for marketing are not. Reports prepared by data brokers 
may fall within FCRA’s coverage depending on the 
purposes for which they are sold. Still, several data 
brokers have successfully convinced courts that their 
activities fall outside FCRA’s scope, even though they 
engaged in activities in covered areas.23 Consumer 
lawyers should consider that data brokers eliding 
FCRA coverage may open themselves up to litigation 
under state law claims, such as defamation, invasion of 
privacy, or negligence, which are otherwise preempted 
under FCRA.24
Consumer rights under FCRA are straightforward, if 
inadequate. Consumers must be given an adverse 
action letter when, based on a consumer report, they 
are denied or offered worse terms for credit, insurance, 
employment, or housing. The letter must contain the 
21  National Consumer Law Center, Fair Credit Reporting 1.2.2 (9th ed. 2017), updated at https://www.nclc.org/
library.
22  Amy Traub, Establish a Public Credit Registry, Demos (2019), https://www.demos.org/sites/default/
files/2019-03/Credit%20Report_Full.pdf.
23  Id. at 2.5.3.2.
24  Chi Chi Wu, Data Gatherers Evading the FCRA May Find Themselves Still in Hot Water, National Consumer Law 
Center, June 14, 2019, https://library.nclc.org/data-gatherers-evading-fcra-may-find-themselves-still-hot-water.
25  Chi Chi Wu, Michael Best & Sarah Bolling Mancini, Automated Injustice Redux: Ten Years After a Key Report, 
Consumers Are Still Frustrated Trying to Fix Credit Reporting Errors, National Consumer Law Center (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/credit_reports/automated-injustice-redux.pdf. 
contact information of the entity that supplied the 
information and notice of rights to dispute the accuracy 
and completeness of the information in the report. 
Consumers can also obtain free copies of their credit 
reports (one per CRA per year), and identity theft 
victims and unemployed persons have additional rights 
to free credit reports. 
Consumers have rights to correct inaccurate and 
outdated information in consumer reports, although 
these processes can be cumbersome and frustrating 
due to automated systems that usually rubber-
stamp the findings of the furnishers, which are the 
companies that provide data to the credit bureaus, 
such as creditors and debt collectors.25 The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) provides self-help guidance to 
consumers for correcting information in a credit report 
in its document, Credit Repair: How to Help Yourself. If 
these remedies are not sufficient, consumers can file 
litigation against CRAs that negligently or willfully fail to 
comply with their FCRA obligations. This area of the law 
can be highly technical, but the National Consumer Law 
Center (NCLC) publishes comprehensive treatises that 
detail available litigation remedies.
Private rights of action are essential because consumer 
report inaccuracy is a major problem. The FTC has 
reported that one in five Americans has an error on 
their credit report and that one in twenty have errors 
Consumer Law
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serious enough to result in the denial of credit or higher 
credit costs.26 The accuracy of reports compiled by 
data brokers is even lower. In light of the shortcomings 
in the credit reporting industry, the NCLC has called for 
reforms,27 including consumer rights to appeal, stricter 
data-matching criteria, more thorough investigations, 
injunctive relief for consumers, and a public credit 
reporting system. Even if credit reporting accuracy 
improves, FCRA’s protections are not substantive. “So 
long as a data broker or employer complies scrupulously 
with the disclosure requirements, the FCRA imposes 
very few substantive limits on the types of information 
that can be collected or disclosed.”28 As a result, 
“FCRA does little to restrict the vast data gathering 
that occurs or to protect against the sharing of highly 
personal or sensitive information.”29
26  Federal Trade Comm’n, Report to Congress Under Section 319 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
Act of 2003 (Dec. 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/section-319-fair-and- 
accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federal-trade-commission/130211factareport.pdf.
27  Testimony of Wu, supra note 15. 
28  Pauline T. Kim & Erika Hanson, People Analytics and the Regulation of Information Under the Fair Credit  
Reporting Act, 61 St. Louis U. L.J. 17, 32 (2016).
29  Id.
30  9 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 2430 et seq.
31  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq., eff. Jan. 1, 2020.
States are beginning to legislate for more substantive 
consumer data protection. In Vermont, data brokers 
must register with the state annually, maintain data 
security standards, and refrain from fraudulently 
acquiring certain types of data or using data for 
harassment or discrimination.30 In California, the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)31 —the first 
comprehensive privacy legislation in the United 
States—gives consumers rights to know what data 
companies are collecting about them, to opt out of 
having their information sold to third parties, and 
to request that a company delete their personal 
information. CRAs are exempt from the CCPA due to 
their coverage under FCRA, but data brokers falling 
outside FCRA are covered. Numerous states and 
Congress are considering bills to enhance consumer 
control over their personal data, resulting in many 
opportunities for low-income consumer advocacy in 
coming years.
●  CRIMINAL RECORDS AND  
EXPUNGEMENT
A troublesome aspect of consumer reporting involves 
the inclusion of criminal records, including records 
that have been expunged or sealed. Every state has 
an expungement and/or sealing statute that permits 
certain criminal records to be deleted from the official 
state record. Expungement statutes are designed to 
reduce the collateral consequences of having a criminal 
record. One in three Americans has a criminal record, and 
“Unfortunately, even if an  
individual obtains an order of  
expungement, the underlying 
criminal record may already  
have been scraped by a data  
broker and included in various 
consumer reports and other  
digital profiles.”
Consumer Law
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despite the lack of a conviction (as is true of the majority 
of criminal records), the collateral consequences can 
result in decreased access to jobs, housing, education, 
and other resources. Unfortunately, even if an individual 
obtains an order of expungement, the underlying criminal 
record may already have been scraped by a data broker 
and included in various consumer reports and other digital 
profiles. Many consumer reporting and background check 
companies lack procedures to update or verify expunged 
criminal records. These failings violate FCRA’s accuracy 
requirements, but they can be hard to uncover and time-
consuming to remedy.
Tracing and removing all mentions of an expunged record 
are difficult. Says attorney Sharon Dietrich, “As I advise 
clients, hopefully they will no longer be affected by the 
expunged case, but they should think of expungement 
like ants in their kitchen; you may think you’ve got them all 
only to later discover that one or two have escaped under 
the refrigerator.”32 There are a variety of steps to try to 
capture the ants, including sending expungement orders 
to large credit reporting companies, requesting criminal 
background check files from the list of companies 
maintained by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
filing complaints with the bureau or the FTC, and pursuing 
FCRA litigation.33
32  Sharon M. Dietrich, Ants Under the Refrigerator? Removing Expunged Cases from Commercial Background 
Checks, Criminal Justice 26 (Winter 2016), https://clsphila.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Ants-under-the- 
Refrigerator-published.pdf.
33  Id. 
34  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Market Snapshot: Background Screening Reports: Criminal  
Background Checks in Employment 16 (Oct. 2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201909_cfpb_
market-snapshot-background-screening_report.pdf.
35  Angela Hanks, Ban the Box and Beyond, Center for American Progress (July 27, 2017), https://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/07/27/436756/ban-box-beyond.
36  Dietrich, supra note 32, at 26. 
States can also do more to fulfill the purpose of their 
expungement statutes. For instance, in Pennsylvania, 
(as a matter of contract) the Administrative Office of the 
Courts requires that bulk purchasers of court records 
follow a lifecycle file approach, maintaining accurate 
updates regarding criminal records and submitting to 
court audits. Minnesota has a similar approach.34 This 
proactive and enforceable solution, placing the burden on 
the purchaser, is ideal and should be pursued nationwide.
Criminal records that are not expungable are also 
deeply problematic. Even if they are accurate, they 
can be a barrier to economic opportunity and public 
assistance, particularly for people of color, who bear a 
disproportionate burden of mass criminalization policies.35 
Criminal background screening (a form of consumer 
reporting) is used by 87% of employers, 80% of landlords, 
and 66% of colleges.36 This has led to ban-the-box 
policies for job and college applicants; these policies 
generally restrict questioning about criminal history on 
initial applications, while permitting criminal background 
checks later in the process when there are opportunities 
for more individualized assessments. The Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) encourages 
individualized assessments in the housing context, and 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has 
issued guidance for employers on how to handle criminal 
records. The use of criminal records in employment and 
education is addressed in more detail in subsequent 
sections of this report.
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● AUTOMATED DEBT COLLECTION
Debt collection is increasingly automated.37 To urge 
debtors to pay, debt collectors deploy automated calls 
(a.k.a., robocalls), texts, emails, and outreach on social 
media. They offer online platforms that feature live help 
or avatars to engage in consumer communications, 
negotiations, and payment collection. They use 
software that can not only predict the best mode of 
communication for a given debtor but also analyze 
speech patterns and deliver personalized content or 
tone. Debt collectors have technology that delivers 
prerecorded messages to voice- mail without causing 
the phone to ring, identifies when people (as opposed to 
voice mail) answer phones, and use caller ID spoofing to 
mask the nature of calls.
Debt collectors also use software to manage accounts, 
oversee the collection process, and track consumer 
discussions and collection activity. To boost their 
productivity, they have adopted video game style 
techniques that let agents view their own performance 
and compete with other agents. Collection analytics 
help debt collectors decide which debt portfolios to 
buy, monitor changes in consumer payment ability, 
target consumers most likely to pay, and scrub certain 
accounts, such as those indicating bankruptcy, death, 
or litigious debtors. The NCLC warns that “the use of 
analytics raises questions about privacy, disparate 
  
37  See National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection 1.5.5 (9th ed. 2018),; Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Study of Third Party Debt Collection Operations 24–25, 32–34 (July 2016), https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Third_Party_Debt_Collection_Operations_Study.pdf.
38  National Consumer Law Center, Fair Debt Collection 1.5.5 (9th ed. 2018), updated at http://www.nclc.org/
library.
39  Federal Communications Comm’n, Report on Robocalls (Feb. 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 
attachments/DOC-356196A1.pdf.
40  Comments on CFBP proposed debt collection rules from consumer, civil and human rights, labor, community 
and legal services organizations, Docket No. CFPB-2019-0022 (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
debt_collection/coalition-comments-debt-collection-sept2019.pdf.
41  15 USC § 1692d.
treatment based on demographic data like race or 
gender, and the potential for unauthorized use of credit 
report data.”38
Consumers can be barraged by these automated 
systems. Indeed, “more than half of the top 20 spam 
callers... are categorized as debt collection callers.”39 
Debt collection activities comprise the majority of 
complaints to the FTC. The debt collection industry 
affects millions of people: about one-third to one-
quarter of adults with a credit report has a debt in 
collection, with medical debt accounting for more than 
half of these debts.40
There are legal remedies to fight debt collection 
harassment. The national Fair Debt Collection Practice 
Act prohibits repeated and continuous calls “with intent 
to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called 
number.”41 Debt collectors cannot call consumers at 
work, call outside the hours of 8 a.m. to 9 p.m., reveal 
debt to third parties, mispresent stale debts as timely, 
obtain information about consumers through false 
pretenses, or make false claims about their identity or 
the consequences of failing to pay a debt. Collectors 
also must cease contact with a consumer when they 
are represented by an attorney or when they have 
written a cease contact letter. A consumer also has 
the right to demand verification of the debt. Fines for 
violations can be significant.
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In addition, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 
(TCPA) forbids the use of auto-dialed and prerecorded 
calls to cell phones. This is helpful because low-income 
consumers are more likely to rely on cell phones than 
landlines. Impermissible calls include those related 
to debt collection and subject violators to liability of 
$500 per call or $1,500 for willful violations. There 
are some grey areas involving whether the act covers 
new technologies that have been designed expressly 
to evade the TCPA’s coverage. There are also legal 
uncertainties around whether consumers in certain 
situations have consented to the calls (which is an 
exception to the ban), although there is consensus that 
consumers can easily revoke any prior consent.
In short, consumers facing harassing or invalid debt 
collection contacts have a variety of legal remedies, 
although concerns around possible discrimination, lack 
of data security, and the sale or other uses of credit 
data require ongoing systemic attention and advocacy.
42  The Pew Charitable Trusts, Fraud and Abuse Online: Harmful Practices in Internet Payday Lending (Oct. 
2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2014/10/payday-lending-report/fraud_and_abuse_online_ 
harmful_practices_in_internet_payday_lending.pdf.
43  The Pew Charitable Trusts, Payday Loan Facts and the CFBP’s Impact (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2016/01/payday-loan-facts-and-the-cfpbs-impact.
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Credit Regulation § 9.6.2 (2d ed. 2015), updated at . 
47  Pew, Fraud and Abuse, supra note 42, at 5; Upturn, Led Astray: Online Lead Generation and Payday Loans 
(Oct. 2015), https://www.upturn.org/reports/2015/led-astray.
● PREDATORY LENDING
Digital profiling makes it easier for predatory 
businesses to identity and target low-income 
consumers with unfair and abusive loan terms. Payday 
lending is one prime example, with a significant online 
presence. A payday loan is a short-term, unsecured, 
high-interest loan that is repayable with the borrower’s 
next paycheck. The average annual percentage rate 
(APR) for online payday loans is 650%.42 Due to high 
interest rates, borrowers struggle to pay back the loans, 
and 80% of payday loans are taken out to cover prior 
loans,43 resulting in a debt trap. Every year, 12 million 
Americans take out payday loans, incurring $9 billion 
in loan fees.44 The average income of borrowers is 
$30,000, and 58% of those borrowers struggle to meet 
monthly expenses.45
Eighteen states have effectively outlawed payday 
lending; many others regulate the industry; and all 
ban deceptive practices in connection with payday 
lending. This tighter regulatory environment, along 
with the potential of enhanced profits, has pushed the 
industry to market aggressively online.46 Seventy-five 
percent of online loans are initiated by lead-generation 
websites, which advertise the payday loans, collect 
consumer information through online forms, and then 
sell the sales leads (potential customers) to lenders.47 
Many consumers land on lead-generator websites after 
“Digital profiling makes it easier 
for predatory businesses to  
identity and target low-income 
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being targeted with ads based on their digital profiles.48 
Although Google and Facebook have officially banned ads 
for payday loans from their platforms, the lending industry 
has found loopholes for reaching consumers online.49
Internet payday lenders typically seek borrower’s 
authorization for electronic debits, electronic access 
to the borrower’s bank account, or payment from 
remotely-created checks. Many internet-based loans 
are structured to ensure that they automatically roll 
over and incur additional fees, thus ensuring long-term 
indebtedness.50 Overall, online payday loans tend to 
have worse terms than storefront loans: “They are 
associated with higher fees, longer-term indebtedness, 
higher rates of borrower abuse, and startling rates of 
fraud.”51 In addition, 30% of borrowers of online payday 
loans report being threatened by a lender or debt 
collector, at higher rates than storefront borrowers do.52 
There are numerous scams involving websites that use 
consumer information to purchase unwanted services, 
trick consumers into paying nonexistent debts, and 
sell consumers bogus debt relief services.53 These 
scammers can be hard to hold accountable because 
they can be difficult, if not impossible, to locate.
Consumers have legal protections from payday lending 
abuses at the federal and state levels. At the federal 
level, a variety of laws apply to payday lending. For 
instance, The Truth in Lending Act requires various 
48  Id. at 46. 
49  See David Dayen, Google Said It Would Ban All Payday Loan Ads. It Didn’t, The Intercept (Oct. 7, 2016), https://
theintercept.com/2016/10/07/google-said-it-would-ban-all-payday-loan-ads-it-didnt.
50  Pew, Fraud and Abuse, supra note 42. “It violates the [Electronic Funds Transfer Act’s] ban on mandatory 
electronic repayment to require recurring automatic electronic payments, whether rollovers of balloon payment loans 
or installment payments on longer-term loan.” National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Credit Regulation, supra note 
43, at 9.6.2.1. 
51  Upturn, Led Astray, supra note 47, at Sec. 2.
52  Pew, Fraud and Abuse, supra note 42, at 1. 
53  Id. at 27.
54  A list of state statutes regarding payday lending is available in Appendix B of the National Consumer Law 
Center treatise on Consumer Credit Regulation.
lender disclosures; the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
forbids discrimination in lending and requires specific 
notices to consumers; the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
prohibits conditioning credit on the preauthorization 
of electronic fund transfers; and the Military Lending 
Act effectively bars payday lending to military service 
members and their families (by prohibiting loans of 
more than 36% APR). However, a previous rule requiring 
that lenders confirm borrowers’ ability to pay was 
rescinded in 2020, and there are agency proposals 
pending to allow payday lenders to partner with banks 
to funnel loans and thereby evade state usury caps, 
a proposal that consumer advocates call rent-a-bank. 
Future regulation of this industry will hinge on the 
commitments of the governing administration.
At the state level, laws vary widely. Some states ban 
payday lending altogether, while others place limits 
on the amount of APR, the length of the repayment 
period, the percentage of a paycheck that can be 
withdrawn for repayment, or the maximum amount of 
the loan.54 In most states, payday loans can be attacked 
as unconscionable or in violation of state unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices statutes. Notably, 
internet-based payday lenders must still comply with 
the law where their borrowers live. Many internet 
lenders are unlicensed in the states where they make 
loans, making their loans potentially unenforceable 
or partially void. Several state attorneys general have 
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sued online lenders that have violated the rights of 
their citizens. Unfortunately, the lending industry is 
constantly developing new predatory products and 
practices to evade legal and advertising restrictions. 
For all these reasons, legal services clients struggling 
with payday loans should be counseled about other 
lending options.55
● IDENTITY THEFT
In 2017, identity thieves stole $16.8 billion from 16.7 
million consumers.56 Credit card fraud is the most 
common form of identity theft; other forms include 
employment and tax-related fraud, and phone and utilities 
fraud.57 Large-scale data breaches happen regularly, 
with CRAs among the targets. In 2017, hackers breached 
Equifax and gained access to the personal information 
(including names, social security numbers, driver’s 
license numbers, birth dates, and addresses) of 168 
million Americans. Equifax did not detect the breach for 
76 days. Breaches are common—anyone who has ever 
shopped at Target, Marshalls, or Home Depot; ridden in 
an Uber; stayed at a Marriott; banked at JPMorgan Chase 
or Capital One; connected on Facebook; played games on 
PlayStation; shopped on eBay; had a Yahoo account; been 
employed by the federal government; or had a credit card 
has had a potential data breach.
55  Tobie Stanger, CFPB Proposes to Relax Payday Loan Regulation, Consumer Reports (Feb. 6, 2019), https://
www.consumerreports.org/consumer-financial-protection-bureau/cfpb-bids-to-relax-payday-loan-regulation.
56  National Consumer Law Center, Fair Credit Reporting, supra note 21, at 9.1.1.
57  Id.
58  Id.
59  Sarah Dranoff, Identity Theft: A Low-Income Issue, American Bar Ass’n Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2014), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_services/publications/dialogue/volume/17/winter-2014/identity-theft--a-
lowincome-issue.
60  Lisa Weintraub Schifferle & Maria Del Monaco, Stolen Future: Foster Youth Identity Theft, 47 Clearinghouse 
Rev. J. of Pov. L & Pol’y 407 (Mar.–Apr. 2014). A study in Los Angeles found that eight percent of sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds were identity theft victims.
61  Id. 
Identity theft is a scary proposition, regardless of 
income level, because of the potential economic losses 
and associated stress. As the NCLC warns, “Once the 
impostor has established himself or herself as the 
consumer, the impostor may leave unpaid credit cards, 
cleaned-out checking accounts, foreclosed mortgages, 
default judgments, bankruptcy declarations, stolen 
tax refunds, and (at worst) arrest warrants all firmly 
stuck to the consumer’s financial identity.”58 Moreover, 
the average identity theft victim spends 60 hours and 
over $1,300 managing the consequences. However, 
the aftermath can play out more harshly for low-
income people, who have fewer resources to manage 
the financial ripple effects of identity theft. Legal 
aid lawyers have seen clients struggle with utility 
shutoffs, mistaken arrests, and incorrect child support 
enforcement orders after their clients’ identity is 
misappropriated by someone else.59
The 700,000 children in foster care are particularly 
vulnerable to identity theft due to the ready availability 
of their personal information as they move through 
the foster care system and come into contact with 
numerous social workers, group homes, foster families, 
and relatives.60 This is compounded by the likelihood of 
non-detection of theft for many years.61 With damaged 
credit, former foster youth can find themselves denied 
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jobs, student loans, car loans, and cell phones.62 A 
federal law requires the states to conduct annual credit 
checks for foster youth over the age of 14 and to fix 
any inaccuracies.63 The law, however, is underenforced 
and can leave teens with unresolved credit issues when 
they age out of the system.64
In light of these impacts, it is thus not surprising 
that a national survey by Data & Society found that 
low-income people report higher levels of concern 
about loss or theft of their information, along with 
greater fears about being targeted for an internet 
scam or fraud.65 In fact, they report higher rates of 
being victimized by online scams that result in financial 
losses.66 Further, the lowest-income households 
are far less likely to use privacy-enhancing settings 
or strategies, such as avoiding sharing sensitive 
information online or turning off web browser cookies.67 
The digital privacy concerns of low-income people 
are intertwined with their offline fears regarding their 
physical safety.68
Victims of identity theft can request that CRAs 
block the reporting of fraudulent information in the 
consumer’s file. This request triggers notification to the 
furnisher of the information, who must then conduct 
an investigation. Consumers can also report identity 
theft directly to creditors, which are prohibited from 
62  Schifferle & Monaco, supra note 60, at 407–08.
63  2 U.S.C. 675(5)(I). 
64  See Madison Howard Churchman, A Clean Slate for Texas Foster Youth: Policy Recommendations on 
Preventing and Resolving Identity Theft for Youth in Foster Care, 4 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 297, 311 (2018).
65  Mary Madden, Privacy, Security, and Digital Inequality, Data & Society (Sept. 27, 2017), https://datasociety.
net/survey-research-low-ses-populations. In comparing the lowest-income households to the highest-earning 
households, concerns about loss or theft of financial information was 60% as compared to 38%; with regard to 
being victimized by an interest scam or fraud, the difference was 48% to 24%. Id. at 2. The highest rates of concerns 
regarding “financial, informational, and physical security” were from foreign-born Hispanic adults. Id. at 5. 
66  Id. at 10. They report lower levels of theft of personal information. Id. Theft of health information is equal 
among income levels. Id.
67  Id. at 9.
68  Id. at 91.
furnishing the information to CRAs. To prevent future 
identity theft, consumers can place security freezes 
or fraud alerts on their files at the big three CRAs, 
which will result in extra verification of identity when 
credit is sought in the consumer’s name. A consumer 
can also take steps to notify retailers not to accept 
checks drawn on fraudulent accounts in the consumer’s 
name. The specifics of these and related processes are 
described in detail in the NCLC treatise on Fair Credit 
Reporting and on the NCLC’s website.
To the degree that CRAs and creditors fail to respond, 
FCRA provides private rights of action to enforce its 
specific protections for identity theft victims, as well 
as the more general FCRA rights for resolving disputed 
debts. There are also state remedies, such as filing 
criminal charges for identity theft, civil cases for fraud 
“...that low-income people report 
higher levels of concern about 
loss or theft of their information, 
along with greater fears about  
being targeted for an internet 
scam or fraud.”
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and deception against identity thieves (although it’s 
difficult to collect on a judgment from identity thieves), 
claims under the Uniform Commercial Code for bank 
negligence, and claims against government agencies 
that provided information to a thief.
● CONSUMER RESOURCES
 ○ Collateral Consequences Resource Center,  
http://ccresourcecenter.org/ 
 ○ Federal Trade Commission, Disputing Errors on Credit 
Reports, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0151-
disputing-errors-credit-reports 
 ○ Federal Trade Commission, Identity Theft: A Recovery 
Plan, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0009_
identitytheft_a_recovery_plan.pdf 
 ○ National Consumer Law Center, Treatises on Fair Debt 
Collection, Fair Credit Reporting, and Consumer Credit 
Regulation, https://library.nclc.org/bookstore 
 ○ National Record Clearing Project, https://clsphila.org/
national-record-clearing-project/ 
 ○ Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the 
Information Age, 2015 Wis. L. Rev. 321 (2015), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2615112 
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Technology impacts people’s 
most personal relationships. 
This section highlights some 
areas family law attorneys for 
low-income families are likely 
to encounter in their practices, 
including predictive analytics 
in child welfare, technologically 
enabled abuses within intimate 
partner relationships, and the 
risk of data scraping of family 
court records, especially given 
that low-income families are 
more likely than wealthier ones 
to engage with court systems to 
resolve family disputes.
69  See Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding Over the Cracks: Predictive Analytics and Child Protection, 46 Fordham 
Urb. L.J. 307, 331 (2019). Algorithms are also being used to recommend appropriate placement settings and match 
children with foster parents. See Devansh Saxena, A Human-Centered Review of the Algorithms Used Within the U.S. 
Child Welfare System, CHI ’20 Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Apr. 
2020), https://www.shionguha.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/chi20c-sub2177-cam-i16.pdf.
70  Alexandra Chouldechova et al., A Case Study of Algorithm-Assisted Decision Making in Child Maltreatment 
Hotline Screening Decisions, 81 Proc. of Machine Learning 1 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/
chouldechova18a/chouldechova18a.pdf.
71  Glaberson, supra note 69, at 310. 
● CHILD WELFARE
Jurisdictions in more than a dozen states have turned to 
predictive analytics to identify children at risk of abuse 
and neglect, and many more are considering adopting 
this algorithmic approach.69 The stakes are high. 
Estimates are that 37% of children in the United States 
have caretakers who are investigated for child abuse 
and neglect by the time they turn 18.70 Child protection 
agencies that fail to identify or ameliorate abuse or 
neglect can have dire consequences for children. At 
the same time, predicting risk where none exists can 
result in family separation, with traumatic impacts on 
parents and children. Given the stakes, along with the 
known biases of human decision-makers, predictive 
analytics holds the potential for more accurate and 
consistent interventions. However, as attorney 
Stephanie Glaberson states, “Unless careful attention 
is paid to the assumptions, biases, and realities of our 
child welfare system at this critical juncture, algorithmic 
decision-making risks perpetuating and magnifying 
existing problems.”71
Predictive analytics in child welfare operate by analyzing 
information from multiple government data sets to 
generate a risk score assessing the likelihood of child 
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maltreatment. The scores are typically used to determine 
whether the agency will engage in further investigation 
and interventions. These scoring systems raise concerns 
around accuracy, fairness, and misuse. Faulty predictions 
can result from errors in data and algorithmic design. One 
national study found that agencies were struggling to 
obtain appropriate data for predictive systems.72 Another 
study found “a lack of theoretically derived and validated 
algorithms that demonstrated that they took measures 
to integrate knowledge from the social sciences into 
their designs.”73
With regard to fairness, there are concerns that 
algorithms will perpetuate the well-known patterns 
of race- and class-based discrimination in the child 
welfare system. These predictive analytics programs 
include data streams that disproportionately implicate 
poor people, such as receipt of public benefits and 
interactions in the criminal justice system. At the same 
time, these algorithmic analyses exclude the invisible 
data generated by the middle-class, who can gather 
support privately from therapists, doctors, private 
rehabilitation programs, and nannies and babysitters 
if they are struggling with mental health or addiction 
issues.74 As Virginia Eubanks explains, this data never 
gets fed into child welfare algorithms.
72  Christopher Teixeira & Matthew Boyas, Predictive Analytics in Child Welfare: An Assessment of Current 
Efforts, Challenges and Opportunities, Prepared for the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Svcs. (Oct. 2017), https://aspe.
hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/257841/PACWAnAssessmentCurrentEffortsChallengesOpportunities.pdf.
73  Saxena, et al., supra note 69, at 8. 
74  Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor 146–47, 
156–57 (2017).
75  Kelly Capatosto, Foretelling the Future: A Critical Perspective on the Use of Predictive Analytics in Child 
Welfare, Kirwan Institute 4 (Feb. 2017), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ki-predictive-
analytics.pdf.
76  See Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 227, 299 (2018).
77  See Glaberson, supra note 69, at 335.
78  Christopher Teixeira et al., Predictive Analytics in Child Welfare: Considerations in Contracting Vendors for 
Predictive Analytics, Report for the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Svcs. (April 2018), https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/
predictive-analytics-child-welfare-considerations-contracting-vendors-predictive-analytics.
79  Saxena et al., supra note 69, at 6–8.
By contrast, “Data that is ostensibly used to rate 
risk to child well-being can serve as a proxy for race 
or other past oppression, thereby over-representing 
those who have suffered from past marginalization as 
more risky,”75 says Kelly Capatosto. Moreover, results 
can be misused when caseworkers overestimate 
their reliability or use results in unintended ways. 
Assessment scores may undermine the ability of 
caseworkers to rely on their professional judgment. 
Where a score suggests intervention, caseworkers 
may err on the side of family separation for fear of 
contradicting the algorithm. Further, the scores 
potentially divert attention away from providing families 
with needed social services that could alleviate the 
need to resort to family separation, such as family 
therapy, childcare assistance, or referral to substance 
abuse treatment.76 In light of these problems, some 
jurisdictions have terminated their experiments with 
child welfare predictive analytics.77
Lawyers who work within the child welfare system 
can advocate for open, transparent processes around 
algorithmic adoption and contracting,78 design, use, and 
evaluation.79 They can use discovery processes such as 
interrogatories, document requests, and depositions 
to obtain information related to the application 
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of algorithmic risk prediction tools in the case. 
Stakeholders80 can advise on ethical issues,81 as well as 
“when and how these tools can be used, what they can 
be used to model, what information they can access, 
who should have access to their scores or outcomes, 
and what individuals can do if they feel that erroneous 
information is utilized, their consent was not adequately 
sought, or they are treated unfairly as a result of 
the algorithm.”82 As one study concludes: “Given the 
limitations of predictive modeling methods, the ethical 
issues surrounding identification of families with a 
high-risk classification, and the potentially negative 
consequences of a false positive identification, 
model applications should be limited to preventive 
approaches and implemented if risk of unforeseen 
negative consequences is minimal.”83 In the future, we 
can expect that automated predictive systems will 
expand to other realms, such as to identify households 
at risk of elder abuse, and possibly to weigh the best 
interests of the child-in-custody determinations. It will 
be essential to apply the emerging lessons from the 
use of algorithms in the child welfare field to these new 
social service domains.
80  Casey Family Programs, Considering Implementing Predictive Analytics in Child Welfare (Apr. 2018), https://
caseyfamilypro-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/media/Considerations-for-Applying-Predictive-Analytics-in-Child-Welfare.
pdf.
81  Ravi Shroff, Predictive Analytics for City Agencies: Lessons from Children’s Services, 5 Big Data 189 (2017), 
http://www.rshroff.com/uploads/6/2/3/5/62359383/predictive_analytics.pdf.
82  Glaberson, supra note 69, at 360.
83  Chris Scharenbroch et al., Principles for Predictive Analytics in Child Welfare, NCCD (Dec. 2017), https://
www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/Principles%20for%20Predictive%20Analytics%20in%20
Child%20Welfare-1.pdf. 
84  Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 951, 952 
(2012). 
85  Adrienne E. Adams, Angela K. Kittwin, & McKenzie Javorka, The Frequency, Nature, and Effects of Coerced 
Debt Among a National Sample of Women Seeking Help for Intimate Partner Violence, Violence Against Women (2019), 
at 2, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1077801219841445?journalCode=vawa.
86  Id. at 7. 
87  Id at 11.
● DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
New technologies raise several issues for domestic 
violence victims and their advocates, including how 
to handle coerced debt that becomes embedded in 
consumer reports, manage digital devices to maintain 
victims’ safety, and respond to risk assessment tools.
Coerced debt is a widespread problem for domestic 
violence victims. Professor Angela Littwin explains 
that it is a form of “financial abuse through consumer 
credit”84 that involves “non-consensual, credit-related 
transactions that occur in an intimate relationship 
where one partner uses coercive control to dominate 
the other partner.”85 A study found that 52% of callers 
to the National Domestic Violence Hotline experienced 
coerced debt.86 Coerced debt can involve an abuser 
applying for credit cards or other loans in a partner’s 
name without their knowledge, as well as forcing a 
victim to obtain loans, buy items on credit for the 
abuser, or apply for public benefits. Both forms of 
coercion can result in debts in the victim’s name and 
a damaged credit score. In cases of fraudulent debt, 
victims often do not discover the victimization until 
the debt is well into the collection process.87 In turn, 
an adverse credit score limits access to housing, 
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employment, utilities, a cell phone, and other needs—all 
of which can be essential to a victim seeking to build 
a life independent of their abuser.88 These economic 
barriers can lead some victims to return to their 
abusers, or even discourage others from leaving their 
abusers in the first place. It also makes them vulnerable 
to predatory financial companies.89
There are steps that victims of coerced debt can take 
to clear their credit, although there are more remedies 
for victims of fraudulent debt (i.e., the victim did not 
know their identity was being used) than for coerced 
debt (i.e., the victim knew but acted under duress). 
Victims of fraudulent debt have the remedies under 
FCRA available to identity theft victims, as outlined 
above, such as disputing debt with CRAs, freezing 
credit, and putting fraud alerts on accounts. Some 
identity theft remedies hinge on filing a police report, 
which can be a problem for domestic violence victims 
who are wary of police involvement. Moreover, lawyers 
in some jurisdictions report that police are reluctant 
to issue reports in domestic violence situations.90 
Relatedly, there are also legal strategies for dealing 
with the consequences of coerced tax fraud and 
for defending against consumer collection actions. 
Regardless of the strategies taken to assist individual 
clients, all remedies must be considered with the 
victim’s safety in mind. An essential resource for 
88  Id. at 12. 
89  See Megan E. Adams, Assuring Financial Stability for Survivors of Domestic Violence: A Judicial Remedy for 
Coerced Debt in New York’s Family Courts, 84 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1387, 1403–04 (2019).
90  Id. at 1393.
91  Ann Baddour & Marissa Jeffery, Abuse by Credit: The Problem of Coerced Debt in Texas, Texas Appleseed, 
http://stories.texasappleseed.org/abuse-by-credit-the-problem-of-coerced-debt-in-texas-.
92  Adams, supra note 89, at 1407.
93  Id.
94  Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. Times (June 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devices-domestic-abuse.html; Karen Levy, Intimate 
Surveillance, 51 Idaho L. Rev. 679, 686–87 (2015).
counseling victims of coerced debt and exploring  
legal remedies is by the Center for Survivor Advocacy 
and Justice.
With regard to coerced debt, remedies for victims are 
more complicated because consumer and family laws 
protect “innocent” third parties that extend credit, 
such as credit card companies. Legal reforms are 
necessary, including clarification that existing identity 
theft laws cover not only coerced debt linked to fraud 
but also debt generated by coercion, as Texas, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Ohio have done with 
their broader definitions of identity theft.91 Reform 
is also needed with regard to legally recognizing 
economic abuse. The Violence Against Women Act (a 
federal law that funds antiviolence initiatives) and two-
thirds of state laws do not recognize economic abuse 
as a form of domestic violence.92 Even in jurisdictions 
where economic abuse is recognized as a harm, courts 
are limited in the corresponding remedies they can 
issue in a protection order.93
In addition to coerced debt, abusers can use various 
technologies to harass, impersonate, track, and 
control their victims by gaining access to texts, social 
media, emails, and smart home technology94 and by 
placing geolocation trackers on cell phones and other 
devices. These tactics are called digital abuse, and 
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it is experienced by 12% of people who have been 
in romantic relationships.95 Technology can be used 
to relay threats, monitor a victim’s movements and 
activities, steal passwords, and engage in public insults, 
among other harms.96 Accordingly, victims may ask 
advocates for assistance in obtaining protective orders 
to stop digital abuse. They may also seek assistance in 
enhancing their online and device privacy.97
Technology is also being developed to prevent domestic 
violence and assist victims, although it will be essential 
to ensure that the tools are accurate and do not 
limit the victim’s autonomy to seek the appropriate 
level of services that best meet their needs. Police 
departments and service providers have used risk 
assessments for many years to assess the victim’s 
level of risk for future abuse. These assessments 
vary in their goals and content and some have limited 
empirical support.98 Certain risk assessment tools 
focus on educating and empowering victims about their 
own safety and available options and resources; the 
empirical record with these tools is also mixed.99
95  Michele Ybarra et al., Intimate Partner Digital Abuse, Data & Society (Jan. 18, 2017), https://datasociety.net/
pubs/oh/Intimate_Partner_Digital_Abuse_2017.pdf.
96  National Network to End Domestic Violence, A Glimpse from the Field: How Abusers are Misusing Technology 
(2014), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51dc541ce4b03ebab8c5c88c/t/54e3d1b6e4b08500fcb45
5a0/1424216502058/NNEDV_Glimpse+From+the+Field+-+2014.pdf.
97  Resources for the latter were developed at Cornell Tech and NYU and are available at this website: https://
www.ipvtechresearch.org/resources.
98  See Emily Turner et al., Dashing Hopes? The Predictive Accuracy of Domestic Abuse Risk Assessment by 
Police, 59 British J. of Crim. 1013 (2019).
99  See Tara Richards et al., An Examination of the Lethality Assessment Program (LAP): Perspectives on 
Implementation, Help-Seeking, and Victim Empowerment, Violence AgAinst Women (oct. 29, 2019).
100  See Robin Petering, et al., Artificial Intelligence to Predict Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration (2018), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329281099_Artificial_intelligence_to_predict_intimate_partner_violence_
perpetration (predicting intimate partner violence among homeless youth).
101  See B. Chandramohan & T. Arunkumar, Prediction and Prevention of Domestic Violence From Social Big Data 
Using Machine Learning Approach, 120 Intl. J. of Pure & Applied Mathematics 3459 (2018), http://iab-rubric.org/
papers/2018_CVPRW_PID5328687.pdf.
102  Richard Berk, et al., Forecasting Domestic Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraignment 
Decisions, 13 J. of Empirical Legal Studies 94 (2016). 
Nevertheless, risk assessments are being digitized 
and integrated with machine learning and predictive 
systems100 that pull from a wider array of data than 
was traditionally available, such as social media 
postings.101 Other technologies under way include facial 
recognition and medical screenings that identify injuries 
consistent with domestic violence; monitoring devices 
for victims to wear that indicate when physical abuse 
is occurring; communication devices that allow victims 
to summon assistance; and apps that allow victims to 
assess their safety and connect them to resources. 
Other technologies are directed at monitoring 
abusers’ whereabouts or predicting their likelihood 
of reoffending.102 All of these emerging, automated 
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● COURT RECORDS CONFIDENTIALITY
The privacy of information contained in courts records 
involving children and family relationships is a concern 
for litigants because court records are increasingly 
available online. The practical obscurity that maintained 
privacy in the paper-based era (i.e., requiring a trip to 
courthouse to pull a court file) has been replaced by 
digital open-access in many cases. This can make 
personally identifying information (such as names, 
phone numbers, emails, and addresses), along with 
sensitive information (financial disclosures, medical 
records, and relationship details), available to the 
general public as well as to the data broker industry.103 
The risks of public access to this information include 
identity theft, safety concerns (especially where 
domestic violence is involved), and digital profiling that 
includes highly sensitive information. At the same time, 
access to court data can be important for lawyers to 
engage in systemic overview and reform of judicial 
processes. There can thus be a tension between the 
need to protect personal information and the need for 
aggregate data that can surface barriers to justice.
103  Erica McCrea, A Survey of Privacy Protections in Guardianship Statutes and Court Rules, 38 BIFOCAL 50 
(2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_aging/publications/bifocal/vol_38/issue_3_february2017/privacy-
guardianship.
104  Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 Geo. L.J. 365, 385 (2018).
Court records are presumed open under the First 
Amendment, although courts will balance this 
presumption against an individual’s privacy rights. 
Matters involving family relationships tend to trigger 
the most protections for court records, although states 
vary widely in the types and extent of information 
protected. Generally, court records are publicly 
inaccessible in cases involving adoption, mental health, 
juvenile dependency, and termination of parent rights. 
Court records in other cases, including domestic 
violence, are generally publicly available. And juvenile 
records are surprisingly accessible electronically, 
creating serious collateral consequences in terms of 
education and jobs for people with records generated 
when they were minors.104
States will often protect certain records within family 
court files from public view, such as financial disclosure 
statements and medical records. In some jurisdictions, 
certain information may be available at the courthouse 
but not released on the internet. At a national level, 
the Violence Against Women Act prohibits internet 
access to identifying information in protective orders 
and restraining orders, but it does not prohibit in-person 
courthouse access. Other privacy provisions in state 
laws typically require the parties to take affirmative 
steps to request access restrictions, which can include 
redaction, sealing, and closed courtrooms. Thus, 
advocates need to know the open records laws in their 
jurisdiction and consider, with their clients, whether to 
seek additional protections where they are available—
and perhaps to advocate for greater protections where 
they are not.
“There can thus be a tension  
between the need to protect  
personal information and the 
need for aggregate data that can  
surface barriers to justice.”
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Major housing trends that 
impact low-income communities 
include the rise of “proptech” 
(property technology),105 the 
digital management of the real 
estate industry, which manifests 
in digital applicant screening 
services, targeted advertising, 
new surveillance systems, and 
a booming short-term rental 
market. This section describes 
the trends impacting tenants, as 
well as issues around housing 
court record confidentiality.106
105  Erin McElroy, Disruption at the Doorstep, Urban Omnibus (Nov. 6, 2019), https://urbanomnibus.net/2019/11/
disruption-at-the-doorstep.
106  Although this report focuses on tenants, low-income homeowners also face digital discrimination when 
data analytics rely on geographical data in advertising and lending practices and thereby reinforce inequalities of 
segregated housing markets. See Alex Rosenblat et al., Data & Civil Rights: Housing Primer, Data & Society (Oct. 30, 
2014), https://datasociety.net/library/data-civil-rights-housing-primer; James A. Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An 
Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for Deterring Algorithmic Redlining, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 219, 230–41 (2019).
107  Aspen Institute, Strong Foundations: Financial Security Starts with Affordable, Stable Housing (2020), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2020/01/Housing-Summary-Brief-1.pdf.
108  Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City 2 (2016).
● TENANT SCREENING
Across the United States, low-income people struggle 
to find affordable and habitable housing. One in three 
households struggles with housing costs that threaten 
their financial stability,107 with a majority of low-income 
renters spending more than half their income on rent—
and often much more.108 While the rise of proptech 
promises frictionless property management for 
landlords, it raises potential pitfalls for tenants.
Landlords are increasingly screening potential tenants 
electronically in two ways. First, they are searching 
online eviction records made available through courts’ 
case management systems. The problem with this 
method is that records used for case management 
purposes are not designed to give landlords the sort 
of information that would be meaningful in making 
a rental decision. They also tend to be plagued with 
inaccurate information, ranging from names and dates 
to dispositions and more. Moreover, court records 
will sometimes show that an eviction case was filed 
without listing the ultimate disposition of the case. 
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understand these limitations of court records. As a 
result, landlords tend to be overinclusive in screening 
applicants out of consideration.
Second, landlords are turning to tenant screening 
companies that score potential tenants across a variety 
of attributes, such as residential history, civil and 
criminal case history, and credit history. These reports 
include the inaccurate and misleading information 
gathered from court records, including a lack of case 
disposition.109 They typically provide landlords with an 
applicant’s “score” but don’t include the underlying 
factors that lead to the score. Landlords will thus claim 
they are treating applicants equally because they do 
not know the underlying bases for those scores. These 
systems lack transparency, making it difficult to know 
whether the data analyzed by the algorithms is accurate, 
whether the algorithms select appropriate factors for 
inclusion, or how various factors are weighted. Without 
transparency, it is hard to hold any person or entity 
accountable for tenant screening decisions, even when 
they are unfair, inaccurate, or discriminatory. 
Tenant advocates are working to bring transparency and 
accountability to this industry. For instance, a pending 
fair housing lawsuit is challenging a tenant screening 
company’s algorithm.110 In Connecticut Fair Housing 
Center v. CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC, a 
mother sought to have her disabled son move in with 
her, and she consented to a background check on her 
son’s behalf. The tenant screening company used by 
the landlord determined that the son was disqualified 
from tenancy based on certain unspecified criminal 
109  See Lauren Kirchner & Matthew Goldstein, Access Denied: Faulty Automated Background Checks Freeze 
Out Renters, The Markup (May 28, 2020), https://themarkup.org/locked-out/2020/05/28/access-denied-faulty-
automated-background-checks-freeze-out-renters.
110  Connecticut Fair Hous. Ctr. v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC, 369 F. Supp. 3d 362, 372 (D. Conn. 2019).
111  Id. at 372.
records. The son had been previously arrested, but 
not convicted, for theft, a charge that was withdrawn. 
In the lawsuit, plaintiffs assert that CoreLogic 
violated the Fair Housing Act by discriminating on 
the basis of race and national origin, given that 
criminal background records reflect disparities in the 
criminal justice system, and by offering a product that 
prevents landlords from conducting an individualized 
assessment of potential tenants. The federal district 
court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment and ruled that the tenant screening company 
was covered by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA).111 The case is proceeding.
Given that one-third of Americans possess a criminal 
record, the unrestrained use of criminal background 
screening in housing (and other domains) risks creating a 
permanent underclass of people unable to access basic 
life necessities. For this reason, in 2016, HUD issued 
Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act Standards to 
the Use of Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and 
Real Estate, which discourages landlords from adopting 
automatic bans of applicants with criminal records and 
Housing
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to hold any person or entity  
accountable for tenant screening 
decisions, even when they  
are unfair, inaccurate, or  
discriminatory.”
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instead recommends individualized determinations.112
The incorporation of tenant eviction records into 
screening reports poses a similar problem;113 such 
records are often incomplete and inaccurate and yet 
can permanently blacklist a tenant. As the founder of 
one tenant screening company told the New York Times, 
“No matter what the reason is and no matter what the 
outcome is ( because) if their dispute has escalated 
to going to court, an owner will view them as a pain.”114 
Low-income women of color are disproportionately 
impacted by tenant blacklists.115 Tenant screening 
reports lack context: they do not necessarily show 
if the tenant won the case, if the tenant raised 
meritorious defenses, or if the case was dismissed.116 
And yet, regardless of fault or outcome, blacklisted 
tenants face ongoing struggles to find affordable and 
safe housing.
Landlords who impose automatic bans on tenants 
with eviction records likely violate the Fair Housing 
Act. A federal lawsuit against a landlord with such a 
policy was settled in 2017; under the settlement, the 
landlord rescinded the automatic ban, and tenants with 
eviction records can now obtain individualized review.117 
Of course, uncovering landlord policies around tenant 
112  U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urb. Dev., Office of General Counsel Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act 
Standards to the Use of Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and Real Estate-Related Transactions (April 4, 2016), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF.
113  Housing Action Illinois & Lawyers’ Committee for Better Housing, Prejudged: The Stigma of Eviction Records 
(March 2018), http://housingactionil.org/downloads/EvictionReport2018.pdf.
114  Teri Karush Rogers, Only the Strongest Survive, N.Y. Times (Nov. 26, 2006), https://www.nytimes.
com/2006/11/26/realestate/26cov.html.
115  Sandra Park, Unfair Eviction Screening Policies Are Disproportionately Blacklisting Black Women, ACLU (Mar. 
30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/violence-against-women/unfair-eviction-screening-policies-
are-disproportionately.
116  Paula A. Franzese, A Place to Call Home: Tenant Blacklisting and the Denial of Opportunity, 45 Fordham Urb. 
L.J. 661, 669 (2018).
117  Nikita Smith v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc. et al., No 2:17-cv-00501 (W.D. Wash. March 30, 2017).
118  Lesley Fair, Federal Trade Comm’n, $3 Million FCRA Settlement Puts Tenant Background Screening at the 
Forefront (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2018/10/3-million-fcra-settlement-
puts-tenant-background-screening.
screening reports may require lawyers or their clients to 
take affirmative steps to request FCRA reports. Under 
the FCRA, applicants for rental housing are entitled 
to information about a screening report that results 
in their denial of housing and to correct inaccurate 
information. In 2018, the FTC entered a $3 million 
settlement with a tenant screening company that failed 
to ensure its data was accurate.118 It was found to have 
been carelessly matching people with similar names and 
birthdates to people with criminal records.
A few states and cities have enacted laws to blunt 
the effects of tenant blacklisting by sealing eviction 
records in certain circumstances, allowing eviction 
records to be expunged, regulating the content of 
tenant screening reports, or disallowing landlords to rely 
on publicly reported eviction data. Lawyers thus need 
to know what remedies are available in their jurisdiction 
to limit the harmful impacts of having an eviction case 
on a tenant’s record. These remedies can be incomplete 
or difficult to enforce, particularly for the majority of 
tenants who lack legal counsel. Moreover, there are 
concerns that tenant screening companies are able 
to scrape data even from sealed or expunged cases. 
Nevertheless, these sorts of provisions are first steps 
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toward securing housing for low-income people and 
provide models for expansion into other jurisdictions and/
or federal legislation.
In sum, there are several mechanisms available to legal 
services lawyers who suspect or have evidence that 
their clients have been adversely impacted by a tenant 
screening report, including seeking the adverse action 
disclosures required under FCRA and state analogues; 
assessing federal and state fair housing claims for 
screening reports that discriminate intentionally on the 
basis of criminal or eviction records or that have  
a disparate impact on protected groups; and, depending 
on jurisdiction, enforcing (or advocating for) state and 
local laws that limit landlords’ access  
to eviction records.
● SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance tools, such as pervasive video cameras, 
are a fact of daily life for many low-income tenants. 
Some tenants welcome these systems for perceived 
security benefits; others are deeply concerned about 
the civil liberties implications of living under constant 
surveillance and the stigmatizing nature of tools that 
presuppose criminality. Tenant advocates are concerned 
that landlords are using selective portions of surveillance 
films as the basis for evictions, while tenants lack 
either access to the footage or the expertise to review 
thousands of hours of files if they can be obtained 
through discovery. In addition, some proptech tools 
require tenants to unlock their doors via smartphones, 
which some populations, such as the elderly, possess 
119  “Given the low Fourth Amendment standards for stops, arrests, and searches in connection with minor 
misconduct, that outsized attention combines with the astounding array of conduct regulated in public and patrolled 
housing to permit police nearly unfettered authority.” Alexis Karteron, When Stop and Frisk Comes Home: Policing 
Public and Patrolled Housing, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 669 (2019).
120  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
121  See Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 1961 (2018) (discussing surveillance ordinances in 
Seattle and New York City). 
122  Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the United States, Georgetown Law 
Ctr. On Privacy & Tech (May 16, 2019), https://www.americaunderwatch.com.
at much lower rates than the general population. Such 
systems can also pose safety and access challenges 
when there are power outages.
As a legal matter, challenging surveillance systems, 
whether they are public or private, is very difficult. The 
Fourth Amendment provides no restraint on government 
surveillance of public spaces,119 and private landlords 
likewise can legally install cameras in any public, common 
area. While the Supreme Court has recently expressed 
concern about targeted surveillance tools,120 there are 
no current constitutional restraints on the government’s 
use of broad-based technology to monitor citizens. 
Further, there are no federal statutes restricting video 
surveillance in public spaces, although a few cities have 
adopted laws that regulate various surveillance tools 
within their jurisdiction.121
A growing form of surveillance is facial recognition 
technology, which uses algorithms to identify people by 
matching their image with those in existing databases, 
such as driver’s licenses, arrest records, and social media. 
Over half of all Americans are in a facial recognition 
database, and those numbers are rising. Concerns about 
facial recognition include its lack of public knowledge 
or input; lower rates of accuracy for people of color, 
particularly women; the chilling effect on free speech; the 
lack of regulation; and the potential for law enforcement 
access without probable cause.122 In the housing context, 
property managers are likely to deploy this technology 
to identify individuals who are barred from the property 
and to use their visits to it as grounds for eviction. This 
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is particularly problematic for domestic violence victims 
whose abusers are barred from the property but who may 
have little control over their abusers’ visits.
In light of these and other concerns, some tenants 
are resisting facial recognition technology. A group 
of low-income tenants in Brooklyn, New York, filed a 
formal complaint with the state agency that oversees 
rent-stabilized properties after their landlord proposed 
replacing their keys with facial recognition technology. 
In the complaint,123 filed by Brooklyn Legal Services, the 
tenants argued that the system was “an intrusion into 
the quiet enjoyment of their private home lives” and 
that the landlord could not establish that the system 
was necessary, accurate, or non biased. The landlord 
ultimately backed down from the plan.
The expansion of facial recognition technology has also 
spurred several cities and states to put moratoriums on 
the technology’s use. Several cities have adopted laws 
limiting how facial recognition technology can be used by 
law enforcement and municipal agencies and requiring 
transparency around its adoption, deployment, and data 
usage. Some states are considering similar limitations, 
while a few states, including Illinois and Texas, already 
restrict commercial uses of biometric data. At the federal 
level, a proposed bill in 2019 would ban public housing 
authorities from adopting facial recognition technology. 
This is a fast-moving landscape of emerging laws; given 
the stakes for low-income people, legal services lawyers 
and their clients should be part of the discussions around 
proposed legislation.
123  In the Matter of The Owner’s Application for Modification of Services, Tenants of Atlantic Plaza Towers, NYS 
Housing & Community Renewal Office of Rent Administration, Docket No. GS2100050D (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.
legalservicesnyc.org/storage/PDFs/%20opposition%20to%20facial%20recognition%20entry%20system%20app.
pdf.
124  National Fair Housing Alliance, Facebook Settlement: Civil Rights Advocates Settle Lawsuit with Facebook: 
Transforms Facebook’s Platform Impacting Millions of Users (2020), https://nationalfairhousing.org/facebook-
settlement (linking to the plaintiff’s complaint and the settlement agreement).
125  Rosenblat et al., supra note 109, at 5. See also Upturn, Leveling the Platform: Real Transparency for Paid 
Messages on Facebook (April 2018), https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/facebook-ads/files/Upturn-
Facebook-Ads-2018-05-08.pdf.
● AD DISCRIMINATION
Housing lawyers should be aware that their clients may 
be seeing—or not seeing—online housing ads tailored to 
their digital profiles. This is a form of digital redlining. In 
2019, Facebook settled a lawsuit brought by numerous 
civil rights groups (including the National Fair Housing 
Alliance) alleging that its advertising platform allowed 
landlords and real estate brokers to target housing ads 
at specific populations while excluding people of color, 
families with children, women, people with disabilities, 
and other protected groups. Under the terms of the 
settlement,124 Facebook agreed to terminate the ability 
of housing, employment, and credit advertisers to 
microtarget viewers based on protected characteristics 
or by zip code. HUD is pursuing a similar lawsuit. 
However, ad delivery systems can replicate inequality 
through a variety of other mechanisms, including 
feeding people ads based on their browsing histories 
or those of their online connections. In turn, these ad 
delivery services can “reflect a prejudicial weblining 
effect and an adverse disparate impact on protected 
classes.”125 These ad delivery systems on internet 
platforms extend far beyond the realm of housing into 
lending, education, and other goods and services. 
Accordingly, poverty lawyers who suspect their 
clients are being denied online access to advertising 
information about housing opportunities should contact 
civil rights and/or fair housing organizations. It is also 
important to help clients identify alternate sources of 
information about housing opportunities.
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●  CONFIDENTIALITY OF HOUSING 
COURT RECORDS
As discussed above in connection with family law, court 
records in housing court can also contain a variety of 
sensitive information about litigants, including social 
security numbers, financial records, and sensitive 
medical and health information—the latter being a 
particular concern in supportive housing cases or in 
cases involving housing for disabled persons. As more 
court systems move to e-filing and online records 
maintenance, it is more likely that data brokers will 
scrape the data and include it in digital profiles, which 
may then be used in a discriminatory or unfair fashion. 
Open court records raise the risk of identity theft and 
other forms of fraud, as do court file data breaches. 
Balanced against these concerns are the American 
judicial system’s commitment to open records.
State laws and policies around protecting privacy 
interests in court records vary widely and are shaped 
by First Amendment interests in access to information. 
Thus, it is essential for poverty lawyers to know the 
scope and scale of what court records are electronically 
available in their jurisdiction. For instance, some states 
allow bulk sales of court data to commercial buyers; a 
handful prohibit it. States vary in the types of data they 
automatically redact or permit parties to redact, such 
as financial information and social security numbers. 
Accordingly, once a lawyer understands what court 
records are publicly available in their jurisdiction, they 
should assess the tools that may be available to protect 
sensitive client information, such as sealing, redaction, 
protective orders, data minimization (putting less 
information on the official record), and stipulations.126 
126  See Jeffrey W. Sheehan, Confidences Worth Keeping: Rebalancing Legitimate Interests in Litigants’ Private 
Information in an Era of Open-Access Courts, 21 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 905 (2019), http://www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/06/2_Sheehan_Final-3.pdf.
127  Josh Bivens, The Economic Costs and Benefits of Airbnb, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.epi.
org/publication/the-economic-costs-and-benefits-of-airbnb-no-reason-for-local-policymakers-to-let-airbnb-bypass-
tax-or-regulatory-obligations.
Legal services lawyers should also demand a seat at 
the table when court systems evaluate and implement 
records access policies.
● SHORT-TERM RENTAL PLATFORMS
The rise of short-term rental platforms, such as Airbnb, 
has mixed effects for low-income people. For some low-
income homeowners, it provides a welcome stream of 
income support, although most property owners using 
rental platforms are white and wealthy. For renters, 
Airbnb is associated with decreases in affordable 
housing because it takes units off the long-term 
rental market, along with increases in average rents.127 
Short-term rental platforms also impact hotel workers, 
because the number of hotel stays decreases as 
short-term rentals increase. These platforms have been 
known to fight both the collection of occupancy taxes 
and compliance with zoning and health regulations. 
In light of these dynamics, housing advocates should 
be aware of the impacts of rental platforms in their 
“As more court systems move to 
e-filing and online records  
maintenance, it is more likely 
that data brokers will scrape  
the data and include it in digital  
profiles, which may then be  
used in a discriminatory or  
unfair fashion.”
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jurisdictions and connect with impacted low-income 
homeowners and tenants to advocate for municipal 
policies that protect their interests.
● HOUSING RESOURCES
 ○ Esme Caramello and Nora Mahlberg, Combating Tenant 
Blacklisting Based on Housing Court Records: A Survey of 
Approaches, 2017 Clearinghouse Review 1 (2017), https://
www.lcbh.org/resources/combating-tenant-blacklisting-
based-housing-court-records 
 ○ A Home of One’s Own: The Fight Against Illegal Housing 
Discrimination Based on Criminal Convictions, and Those 
Who Are Still Left Behind, 95 Texas L. Rev. 1103 (2017), 
http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/
Crowell.pdf 
 ○ National Center for State Courts, Privacy/Public Access 
to Court Records, https://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-
and-Fairness/Privacy-Public-Access-to-Court-Records/
Resource-Guide.aspx 
 ○ Ariel Nelson, National Consumer Law Center, Broken 
Records Redux: How Errors by Criminal Background Check 
Companies Continue to Harm Consumers Seeking Jobs 
and Housing, Dec. 2019, https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
criminal-justice/report-broken-records-redux.pdf 
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States are using algorithms to determine public 
benefits eligibility and identify supposed fraud in 
benefits receipt. Legal services attorneys who 
handle any form of government assistance, elder 
law, or health law will interact with these systems. 
Despite promises of increased efficiency and cost 
savings, automated decision-making systems tend 
to lack transparency and accountability and can be 
inaccurate and unfair, while denying many claimants 
their due process rights. Eubanks calls this shift 
toward automated systems the digital poorhouse, 
in which “surveillance and digital social sorting 
are driving us apart, targeting smaller and smaller 
microgroups for different kinds of aggression and 
control.”128 Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur  
on extreme poverty and human rights, warns that  
we have entered a digital dystopia in which “systems 
of social protection and assistance are increasingly 
driven by digital data and technologies that are used 
to automate, predict, identify, surveil, detect, target 
and punish.”129 Professor Sarah Valentine states, “Big 
data analytics provides the state a degree of control 
over marginalized populations that is unrivaled in 
American history.”130
There are thousands of horror stories of disabled and 
needy people being denied desperately needed state 
support due to an algorithmic eligibility determination. 
128  Eubanks, supra note 74.
129  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, World Stumbling Zombie-Like into a Digital 
Welfare Dystopia, Warns UN Human Rights Expert (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25156&LangID=E.
130  Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 
46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 364, 369 (2019), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2758&context=ulj.
For instance, in 2016, Indiana entered a 10-year, $1.3 
billion contract with IBM and a private call center 
company to automate its public benefits programs, 
including Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP). The algorithms employed 
to assess eligibility resulted in the denial of one million 
benefits in three years for “failure to cooperate”; this 
was an increase of 54% from the prior three years. 
IBM’s system regularly lost claimants’ records and 
verification documents, while penalizing people whose 
applications were missing documents or who made 
a mistake on a form (which could run to 120 pages). 
Thousands of people lost benefits, including a woman 
who missed a recertification phone call for Medicaid 
benefits because she was in the hospital being treated 
for ovarian cancer and was subsequently terminated for 
“There are thousands of  
horror stories of disabled and 
needy people being denied  
desperately needed state support 
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noncompliance.131 After three years, the state cancelled 
the contract and sued IBM. The Indiana Supreme Court 
eventually upheld a damages award to the state of $78 
million.132
Problems with automated decision-making can arise 
from a variety of overlapping sources. To begin with, 
software developers must translate complex and often 
ambiguous regulatory requirements into computer 
code. Harmful errors have occurred in this transfer of 
lawmaking power to private vendors. Professor Danielle 
Citron explains that “programmers routinely change 
the substance of rules when translating them from 
human language into computer code.”133 She describes 
programmers in Colorado who, over three years, 
inaccurately translated at least nine hundred state 
regulatory requirements into code, leading to hundreds 
of thousands of erroneous decisions, including 
improper denials of health care to pregnant women, 
women with breast and cervical cancer, and foster 
children, as well as improper denials of food stamps 
to the disabled.134 Such problems extend far beyond 
Colorado.135 In addition to these translation errors, 
some of the algorithmic programs are simply wrong; 
they do not predict what they promise. Or they cannot 
handle outliers who do not fit the algorithm’s preset 
parameters. Further, algorithms are fed data sets that 
often contain inaccurate or incomplete information. 
Meanwhile, some government agencies are purchasing 
131  Eubanks, supra note 74.
132  IBM Corp. v. Indiana, 124 N.E.3d 1187 (2019).
133  Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 3, at 1254.
134  Id. at 1256, 1268–69.
135  Id. at 1270–71 (discussing similar errors in California and Texas); Valentine, supra note 133, at 372–73 
(discussing public benefits problems in New York City and Michigan).
136  K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 298 F.R.D. 479 (D. Idaho 2014).
137  See e.g., K.W. ex rel. D.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2015) (inadequate notice violated 
procedural due process and Medicaid requirements). See also cases collected in Valentine, supra note 133, at 
415–16.
138  Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336 (Ark. 2017).
algorithmic software without competitive bidding 
or public input, and they lack understanding of how 
algorithms work or the ongoing mechanisms for auditing 
and compliance monitoring.
Given this landscape, it’s unsurprising that legal 
services lawyers have successfully challenged 
automated eligibility systems in several states 
and gained needed reforms. Courts have ruled that 
automated decisions that deny or reduce benefits 
without adequate notice or explanation deny 
constitutional due process rights to beneficiaries.136 
At the statutory level, courts have ruled that certain 
algorithms violate substantive requirements contained 
in laws and regulations.137 In addition, the shift to 
automated decision-making can violate fundamental 
administrative law requirements, which in turn can be 
grounds for challenging algorithmic outcomes. When an 
agency secretly adopts algorithms that alter existing 
standards and processes, it can violate notice and 
comment requirements;138 constitute arbitrary and 
capricious rulemaking; and result in administrative 
decisions lacking substantial evidence.
Cases that challenge algorithmic systems are complex 
and resource-intensive, and can require expert input 
and testimony. Indeed, says Valentine, “recent decisions 
reveal a judiciary that is struggling to grasp the 
technology and is relying on advocates to contextualize 
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system failures within the appropriate constitutional 
and statutory frameworks, be they criminal or civil.”139 
In an individual case (as opposed to the class action 
and multi-plaintiff cases described above), lawyers 
litigating algorithmic determinations can raise many of 
the same arguments regarding procedural due process, 
substantive legal requirements, and administrative  
law standards.
Of course, litigation is not the only option for 
challenging algorithmic decision-making. Legal services 
lawyers have also successfully pressured legislators 
to engage in agency oversight and coordinated with 
the media to educate the public about the algorithmic 
deficiencies in these programs.140 As a result, some 
jurisdictions have proposed or adopted laws designed 
to enhance algorithmic accountability. It is also 
essential for legal services lawyers and their clients 
to be at the table when government agencies decide 
to adopt new automated decision-making systems or 
replace legacy computer systems. Legal aid attorney 
Julia Simon-Mishel was involved as a stakeholder in 
a group overseeing Pennsylvania’s adoption of a new 
unemployment insurance system. She describes 
a vendor’s proposal to tag fraud when a benefits 
applicant lists the wrong employer from a pull-down 
menu. However, as Simon-Mishel pointed out to the 
stakeholder group, many employees only know the 
public-facing name of an employer and do not know the 
official name under which the employer is registered 
as a corporation. In turn, this could result in a wrongful 
139  Valentine, supra note 133, at 409. 
140  Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz, & Vincent M. Southerland, Litigating Algorithms 2019 US Report: New 
Challenges to Government Use of Algorithmic Decision Systems (AI Now Institute, Sept. 2019), https://ainowinstitute.
org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf.
141  See Michele Gilman, AI Algorithms Intended to Root Out Welfare Fraud Often End Up Punishing the Poor 
Instead, The Conversation (Feb. 14, 2020), https://theconversation.com/ai-algorithms-intended-to-root-out-welfare-
fraud-often-end-up-punishing-the-poor-instead-131625; Stephanie Wykstra, Government’s Use of Algorithm Serves 
up False Fraud Charges, Undark (June 1, 2020), https://undark.org/2020/06/01/michigan-unemployment-fraud-
algorithm.
142  Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 892–93 (6th Cir. 2019). The court eventually approved a 
settlement in which the state agreed to cease operations.
denial of benefits or even the charge of fraud, which has 
its own collateral consequences. Without this insight 
into the perspective of claimants, the system might be 
designed to detect those innocent mistakes as fraud. 
Stakeholder input makes a difference.
As this example shows, states are using automated 
decision-making to ferret out alleged fraud in public 
benefits programs.141 A high-profile system failure 
occurred in Michigan, which in 2013 automated its 
unemployment insurance benefits system with a 
$47 million program called Michigan Integrated Data 
Automated System (MiDAS) and laid off one-third of 
its workforce.142 To identify fraud, MiDAS searched 
for discrepancies in recipients’ records by cross-
matching them with records from employers, other 
state agencies, and the federal government. Fraud 
determinations tripled to 40,000 in just two years—
but 93% of them were wrong. How did MiDAS fail so 
spectacularly? Among the causes: the computer sent 
many notices to incorrect and dormant addresses; it 
issued vague notices; it could not distinguish between 
innocent mistakes and intentional fraud; it was 
designed to result in inadvertent admissions of fraud; 
and its process lacked recourse to human decision-
makers. Upon a finding of fraud, the state demanded 
repayments plus interest and civil penalties of four 
times the amount owed; some assessments were 
as high as $187,000. To collect the funds, the state 
garnished wages, levied bank accounts, and intercepted 
tax refunds. The resulting financial stress resulted 
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in bankruptcies, damaged credit reports, evictions, 
homelessness, and even suicides. Litigation for 
damages to claimants continues.
Despite these cautionary tales, technological 
applications for identifying fraud are expanding. 
For instance, the Sacramento County (California) 
Department of Human Assistance entered into a 
contract with a private vendor that collects and stores 
license-plate reader data for use in investigating 
welfare fraud.143 In light of these and other emerging 
technologies, poverty lawyers will need to stay attuned 
to state adoption of and changes to automated 
systems impacting eligibility and fraud determinations, 
including by monitoring public notice and comment 
rulemakings and funding bills where state agencies 
are seeking money to purchase new technologies. In 
addition, case surges with regard to particular benefits 
can signal adoption of new technologies. Lawyers will 
then need to advocate with state agencies to ensure 
that these systems are accurate, accountable,  
and transparent.
143  Dave Maass, County Welfare Office Violated Accountability Rules While Surveilling Benefits Recipients, 
Electronic Frontier Found. (July 31, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/07/county-welfare-office-violated-
accountability-rules-while-surveilling-benefits.
● Public Benefits Resources
 ○ Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick, and Genie Barton, Brookings, 
Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices 




 ○ Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided 
Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 364, 409 (2019), https://ir.lawnet.ford-
ham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2758&context=ulj 
 ○ AI Now, Litigating Algorithms 2019, https://ainowinstitute.
org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf 
 ○ AI Now, Algorithmic Accountability Policy Toolkit,  
https://ainowinstitute.org/aap-toolkit.pdf 
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Legal services lawyers who  
represent students and families 
in educational matters are  
most likely to see the impacts  
of technology in school  
surveillance and discipline in 
K–12 school systems, as well  
as predatory lending in the  
higher education sphere.
144  Schools are also using instructional technologies that allow private companies to mine student data for 
advertising and marketing purposes. See Barbara Fedders, The Constant and Expanding Classroom: Surveillance in 
K-12 Public Schools, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 1673, 1682–83 (2019). They are also using technologies to personalize education 
in ways that may entrench existing inequalities. See Andrea Alarcon et al., Data & Civil Rights: Education Primer, Data 
& Society (Oct. 30, 2014), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Education.pdf. While data mining 
is unlikely to be litigated in a civil legal services case, lawyers should be aware of how students’ information is being 
gathered and processed in the event a client is involved in a school discipline case.
145  Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 94 Ind. L.J. 47, 52–54 (2019). 
146  Fedders, supra note 147, at 1675.
●  SURVEILLANCE AND  
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
School systems are adopting new surveillance systems 
in the hopes of preventing school violence and identifying 
at-risk students for interventions.144 Schools, particularly 
in minority communities, have long deployed security 
mechanisms generated within the criminal justice 
system, such as uniformed security officers, security 
cameras, metal detectors, and body searches.145 A new 
repertoire of surveillance tools is layered on top of these 
methods, but these new tools are less visible. Companies 
sell these technologies to school districts as a means for 
predicting students’ potentially harmful behavior.  
As a result, millions of students across the country are 
being monitored by surveillance systems that provide 
24-hour analysis of words and phrases in students’ social 
media accounts, chat messages, email, and schoolwork. 
These systems then alert school officials when they 
identify terms of concern. Professor Barbara Fedders 
explains, “The various mechanisms of surveillance 
combine to make more information available about more 
students, for a longer period of time, and accessible to a 
greater number of actors than was possible before the 
digital age.”146
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Some jurisdictions are using facial recognition 
technology to identify unauthorized visitors to school 
campuses. Another technology being promoted to 
schools is aggression detecting microphones, which 
their makers claim will identify anger in students’ voices 
before tensions escalate.147 The State of Florida is 
rolling out a system called the Florida Schools Safety 
Portal, which collects, aggregates, and analyzes data 
from school records, social services, and criminal 
records, along with public tips and social media scans, 
and makes the results available to law enforcement. 148
School-based surveillance systems are generally 
legal under the Fourth Amendment; the governmental 
interest in reducing school crime is deemed to 
outweigh the privacy interests of students. Critics 
charge that school surveillance impinges the privacy 
and free speech rights of students in ways that 
can harm their creativity, social development, and 
educational outcomes; poses data security risks; 
and lacks empirical support for vendors’ claims about 
improving student safety.149 Most importantly for legal 
147  Jack Gillum & Jeff Kao, Aggression Detectors: The Unproven, Invasive Surveillance Technology Schools are 
Using to Monitor Students, ProPublica (June 25, 2019), https://features.propublica.org/aggression-detector/the-
unproven-invasive-surveillance-technology-schools-are-using-to-monitor-students.
148  See Anya Kamenetz & Jessica Bakeman, To Prevent School Shootings, Districts Are Surveilling Students’ 
Online Lives, NPR (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/12/752341188/when-school-safety-becomes-
school-surveillance. A coalition of civil society groups wrote in opposition to the portal, in part because of potential 
harms on vulnerable groups. Valerie Strauss, Civil Rights, Disabilities Groups Urge Florida to Stop Building Student 
Database They Call “Massive Surveillance Effort,” Wash. Post (July 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
education/2019/07/10/civil-rights-disabilities-groups-urge-florida-stop-building-student-database-they-call-
massive-surveillance-effort.
149  See Fedders supra note 147, at 1702 (“the evidence of efficacy is scant; others have not been tested at 
all”); Benjamin Herold, Schools are Deploying Massive Digital Surveillance Systems. The Results are Alarming, Ed. 
Week (May 15, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/30/schools-are-deploying-massive-digital-
surveillance-systems.html.
150  See Priyam Madhukar, The Hidden Costs of High-Tech Surveillance in Schools, Brennan Ctr. for Justice (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/hidden-costs-high-tech-surveillance-schools.
151  Nance, Implicit Racial Bias, supra note 148, at 72. 
152  Sharada Jambulapati, Story From the Field: Children of Color Pushed Out of Alabama Schools Over Social 
Media Posts, Southern Poverty Law Center (July 9, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/07/09/story-field-
children-color-pushed-out-alabama-schools-over-social-media-posts-0.
services lawyers who represent students in disciplinary 
hearings, these data-centric tools may also adversely 
and disproportionately impact minority students 
and students with disabilities.150 Empirical evidence 
establishes that minority students are surveilled and 
punished for behavior at higher rates than similarly 
situated white students.151
These student populations are already at higher risk 
of entering the school-to-prison pipeline, the trend in 
which punitive school discipline policies, such as zero 
tolerance policies, shift children out of schools and 
into the criminal justice system. Issues that should 
be handled within families and communities become 
matters for law enforcement and state control.  
A study of one school district in Alabama found that  
12-out-of-14 students expelled from school due to 
social media postings were African American, although 
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The predictive algorithms that underlie school 
surveillance, as well as their human analysts and 
adopters, may not understand the cultural vernacular 
of certain students, including immigrants, religious 
minorities, and students with disabilities. The risk 
is that the algorithm, and then school officials, will 
misinterpret innocent topics, slang, or jokes on social 
media as threats and push students into disciplinary 
proceedings and possibly involve law enforcement153 
In addition, school district officials are quick to 
scour for and punish sexualized language or imagery, 
even though such expressions are normal parts of 
normal adolescent development. Female students, 
particularly low-income girls of color, are particularly 
at risk of this form of surveillance. Accordingly, 
lawyers need to understand adolescent development 
in order to recognize normal behavior patterns and 
resist criminalizing frameworks.
In light of these trends, education lawyers will need 
to stay abreast of the surveillance technologies 
deployed in their jurisdiction and be attentive to any 
new patterns of school discipline, including among 
students with disabilities, who have special legal 
protections under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for 
conduct related to their disabilities. While school 
discipline policies vary by state and locality, they all 
provide for some form of due process hearing before 
153  Social Media Monitoring in K-12 Schools: Civil and Human Rights Concerns, Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. 
& Brennan Center for Justice (Oct. 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/CDT%20
Brennan%20Statement%20on%20School%20Social%20Media%20Monitoring.pdf.
154  On defending students in school discipline proceedings, see e.g., School Discipline in New Jersey: A Toolkit 
for Students, Families, and Advocates, Ed. Law Ctr. (2018), https://edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/
Student_discipline_manual.pdf; The School Discipline Process: A Handbook for Maryland Families and Professionals, 
Disability Rights Maryland (2015), https://disabilityrightsmd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Discipline-Manual.
updated-July-2017.online-version.pdf; Talia Kraemer & Zabrina Aleguire, Defending Students in Expulsion Proceedings: 
A Manual for Pro Bono Attorneys in CA, Legal Services for Children (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.lsc-sf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/LSC-Expulsion-Defense-Manual.pdf.
155  20 U.S.C. § 1232g and 34 C.F.R. Pt. 99.
students are excluded from educational settings, 
and those hearings may also be sites for identifying 
and challenging surveillance tools.154 Lawyers should 
ask for all evidence that the school is using against 
the student in a disciplinary proceeding. Under the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),155 
parents have the right to inspect and view their child’s 
educational records, including surveillance footage 
and other electronic evidence. A careful reading of 
FERPA and persistent advocacy are often necessary 
to obtain the evidence the school is using against  
a student.
Finally, and from a systemic perspective, under 
the Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015 (ESSA), 
school districts must publicly report the rates of 
suspensions, expulsions, school-related arrests, 
referrals to law enforcement, chronic absenteeism, 
and incidences of violence at the state, district, 
and school levels. This data may be helpful in 
understanding how new technologies are impacting 
school disciplinary practices and provide data for 
stakeholder input at the state and local level to 
support advocacy for reducing unfair and exclusionary 
discipline practices, such as through restorative 
justice programs and wraparound social services.
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● FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES
The for-profit higher education industry engages in 
predatory practices that target low-income students, 
people of color, single parents, older students, and 
veterans.156 To enroll in for-profit colleges, students 
typically take out large, federally insured loans, yet 
these programs are of questionable quality and often 
do not result in the promised employment. One chain 
of for-profits investigated in 2017 by the California 
attorney general was charged with lying to students 
about job prospects, employing aggressive admissions 
counselors with rigid enrollment targets, saddling 
students with massive debt, and using unlawful debt 
collection practices.157
Many potential students are targeted via lead 
generation.158 Consumers who search online for terms 
related to education or employment ads are tagged by 
web browser cookies that track their online activity 
and allow for-profit colleges to follow them across 
the internet with targeted ads. When consumers fill 
out online forms posted by lead generators, their 
information is combined with other data about them 
to generate a score determining whether they are 
desirable targets. The Government Accountability 
Office conducted an investigation finding that within 
156  See generally Tressie McMillan Cottom, Lower Ed: The Troubling Rise of For-Profit Colleges in the New 
Economy (2017); Genevieve Bonadies, et al., For-Profit Schools’ Predatory Practices and Students of Color: A Mission 
to Enroll Rather than Education, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (July 30, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/for-profit-
schools-predatory-practices-and-students-of-color-a-mission-to-enroll-rather-than-educate.
157  See Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, California Attorney General Sues For-Profit Bridgepoint Education, Wash. Post 
Nov. 29, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/11/29/california-attorney-general-
sues-for-profit-bridgepoint-education.
158  Ctr. For Digital Democracy & U.S. PIRG, Private For-Profit Colleges and Online Lead Generation: Private 
Universities Use Digital Marketing to Target Prospects, Including Veterans, via the Internet (May 2015), https://
uspirgedfund.org/reports/usf/private-profit-colleges-and-online-lead-generation.
159  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, For-Profit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges Encouraged 
Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and Questionable Marketing Practices 15 (Aug. 4, 2010), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/130/125197.pdf.
160  Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicholas Turner, Gainfully Employed? Assessing the Employment and Earnings 
of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative Data (NBER Working Paper Series May 2016), https://
predatorystudentlending.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2016_-_NBER_-_worse_off.pdf.
five minutes of entering a potential student’s name and 
number into a single lead-generation site, the “student” 
received a recruiting call, followed by over 180 more 
calls within one month.159
Only 26% of students at for-profit colleges graduate 
within six years, as compared to 60% at public and 
private nonprofit schools. Even for those students 
who graduate, their job outcomes are actually worse 
than people with just a high school diploma.160 Half of 
for-profit college students default on loans within five 
years of entering repayment, and there is no statute of 
limitations on collecting federal student debt. Although 
the Obama administration put in place regulations to 
“To enroll in for-profit colleges, 
students typically take out large, 
federally insured loans, yet these 
programs are of questionable 
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rein in industry abuses, these regulations have either 
been revoked or are in the process of being rescinded 
by the Department of Education, which is also halting 
numerous investigations into the for-profit education 
industry.161 Future policies and enforcement will hinge 
on the commitments of the governing administration.162
In the face of these abuses, there are a variety of legal 
remedies, although they vary for public and private 
loans. Some states have relief programs (called 
state tuition recovery funds) for students victimized 
by predatory for-profit college conduct or school 
closures. There are also federal discharge programs 
that provide borrower defenses to repayment for 
school closures, although the Department of Education 
under Secretary Betsy DeVos has been gutting this 
defense, and litigation over the department’s policies 
is ensuing. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (and 
state analogues) can protect against harassing and 
misleading debt collection practices,163 and the TCPA 
can protect against certain debt collection robocalls 
to cell phones. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act has 
been the basis of lawsuits challenging discriminatory 
recruiting practices targeted at minorities. Students 
can also bring affirmative claims against schools that 
engaged in predatory conduct, as well as lenders and 
loan holders affiliated with the schools.164 Students 
can also file complaints with state and federal agencies 
that oversee the industry.
161  Bonadies et al., supra note 160.
162  There are multiple policy reforms that would protect students, see Robert Shireman, The Policies That Work 
– and Don’t Work – to Stop Predatory For-Profit Colleges, The Century Foundation (May 20, 2019), https://production-
tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2019/05/20105707/Shireman_9policies_FinalPDF1.pdf.
163  State claims may be particularly important in light of FDCPA exemptions for creditors, servicers, and 
government agencies; however, there are federal preemption issues. National Consumer Law Center, Student Loan 
Law 14.2.4.2 (6th ed. 2019), updated at https://www.nclc.org/library.
164  Id. at Ch. 14.
● EDUCATION RESOURCES
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Technology is reshaping the 
American workplace, with some 
adverse impacts on low-wage 
workers who may seek legal  
representation to learn and assert 
their rights. This section covers 
workplace legal problems  
typically handled by legal  
services offices, such as digital 
wage theft, automated scheduling 
and hiring systems, and worker  
monitoring. Unemployment  
insurance is another key issue  
for worker advocates as states 
replace their legacy systems with 
machine learning systems for  
eligibility and fraud detection;  
it is addressed in the “Public 
Benefits” section of this report.
165  David Cooper & Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions From Workers’ Paychecks Each Year, Economic 
Policy Institute (May 10, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-
each-year.
166  Elizabeth C. Tippett, How Timekeeping Software Helps Companies Nickel and Dime Their Workers, The 
Conversation, Jan. 11, 2017), https://theconversation.com/how-timekeeping-software-helps-companies-nickel-and-
dime-their-workers-70981.
167  Elizabeth Tippett, Charlotte S. Alexander & Zev Eigen, When Timekeeping Software Undermines Compliance, 
19 Yale J.L. & Tech. 1 (2018).
● DIGITAL WAGE THEFT
Low-wage workers have long suffered from wage 
theft, that is, the failure to be paid for work performed. 
Studies show the amount of wage theft is over $15 
billion per year.165 A rising scourge is digital wage theft, 
which results from timekeeping software used for 
hourly employees, who constitute almost 60% of the 
American workforce.166 Instead of the punch cards of 
yore, employees now log their time through computers, 
smartphones, RFID badges, and iris recognition devices, 
and in turn this information is electronically transmitted 
to timekeeping software.167 At first glance, this 
software might seem far more accurate and foolproof 
than records kept by hand. However, some automated 
timekeeping software allows employers to edit down 
hours worked, automatically round arrival and departure 
times to a preset increment that shaves off time 
worked, and impose automatic break deductions, which 
assume the worker took the full break allowed, even 
if work conditions made that impossible (a common 
problem for health care providers).
Professor Elizabeth Tippett analyzed hundreds of 
cases of digital wage theft, including one case in which 
the use of rounding software caused 2,100 casino 
workers to lose a combined 87,710 hours over five 
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years, amounting to nearly $950,000 at their $10.80 
hourly wage. Unfortunately, existing regulations 
governing timekeeping were written over 50 years ago, 
during an era when time was kept by hand and exact 
precision was not realistic, and thus they permit the 
practice of rounding. As a result, workers challenging 
these practices have the burden to prove that the 
rounding practices do not average out in the long 
term. Yet, timekeeping software is programmed to 
favor employers so that averaging out is no longer a 
sound presumption. Additionally, employees lack the 
knowledge to understand how their time is counted, 
creating an information asymmetry.
Workers challenging digital wage theft have remedies 
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),168 as 
well as state and local wage and hour laws. Although the 
FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements aren’t enforceable 
in a private action, workers can enforce the act’s 
substantive requirements. FLSA requires covered 
employers to pay a minimum wage for each hour worked 
and an overtime wage for time worked over 40 hours. 
Remedies for wage theft can include back wages and 
hefty penalties. Unfortunately, collecting on wage 
judgments from some employers can be extremely 
challenging, as they may change addresses, dissolve 
their company, and otherwise hide assets. As a result, 
some states allow workers to put a lien on employer 
assets before or at the time a complaint is filed. 
168  U.S. Dept. of Labor, Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa.
169  Chris Opfer, Prosecutors Treating “Wage Theft” as a Crime in These States, Bloomberg Law (June 26, 2018), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/prosecutors-treating-wage-theft-as-a-crime-in-these-states.
Further, depending on the state and its commitment to 
enforcing its wage laws, workers may find assistance 
enforcing their rights from state labor agencies, and in 
some jurisdictions, criminal prosecutors are charging 
employers with wage theft.169 Due to the technological 
transformations in timekeeping, advocates need to be 
familiar with how timekeeping software operates and 
to know the full range of enforcement and recovery 
options in their jurisdiction.
● UNPREDICTABLE SCHEDULING
Unpredictable scheduling is a major problem in the 
low-wage workforce. Many employers use just-in-time 
software that allows them to schedule shifts with 
little notice in order to reduce wage costs and manage 
staffing levels. However, for workers, erratic scheduling 
make planning budgets, childcare, family obligations, 
medical appointments, education, and other jobs 
challenging and stressful.
Accordingly, several states and jurisdictions—including 
Vermont, Oregon, New York City, San Francisco, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, and Seattle—have passed predictive 
scheduling laws, also called fair workweek laws. Laws 
vary, but they generally cover retail, hospitality, and fast 
food workers; and typical provisions include requiring 
advance notice of schedules, extra pay for scheduling 
changes, guarantee of minimum shifts, and rest periods 
between shifts. By contrast, some states— such as 
Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, and Tennessee—have laws 
forbidding their counties and cities from passing 
employment-related laws, which is a way to preempt fair 
workweek laws in those states.
Legal services lawyers in jurisdictions with fair 
workweek laws may handle compliance issues as 
employers adjust to (or attempt to evade) the new 
“A rising scourge is digital wage 
theft, which results from time-
keeping software used for hourly 
employees, who constitute almost 
60% of the American workforce.”
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standards. In places lacking fair workweek legal 
protections, advocates may want to join or support 
coalitions advocating for adoption of such laws.
● AUTOMATED HIRING
Employers are increasingly using predictive decision-
making tools to hire workers. The technology enables 
them to determine where to post jobs and what 
audiences to target, screen qualified candidates, and 
conduct preemployment assessments. In addition, new 
technologies are being used to conduct automated 
video interviews. Applicants are then scored based 
on analysis of their facial expressions, tone of voice, 
conversational content, and other factors.170 Software 
vendors have touted these various tools for their 
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and lack of prejudice, 
which can bedevil human interactions.171
However, privacy and employment advocates have 
cautioned that these technologies can replicate 
existing structural biases in society because they 
are trained on datasets that include the embedded 
biases of prior generations.172 For instance, Amazon 
tested, and subsequently abandoned, an algorithm to 
hire employees that was based on the prior 10 years 
of résumés of successful company hires.173 Because 
those hires were predominately male due to the gender 
imbalance within the tech industry, the algorithm 
consistently recommended men over women. Similar 
170  Illinois passed a law requiring notice, consent, deletion rights, and an explanation to applicants if they are 
using AI for video interviews. Other states may follow suit. See Rebecca Heilweil, Illinois Says You Should Know if AI is 
Grading Your Online Job Interviews, Vox Recode (Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/1/1/21043000/
artificial-intelligence-job-applications-illinios-video-interivew-act. 
171  See Miranda Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce Bias, Harvard Bus. Rev. (May 6, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/05/all-the-ways-hiring-algorithms-can-introduce-bias.
172  See Pauline Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 Va. L. Rev. 867 (2020).
173  Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against Women, Reuters (Oct. 
9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-
recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-idUSKCN1MK08G.
174  See Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia L. McCormick, & Jintong Tang, The Law and Policy of People 
Analytics, 88 U. Colo. L. Rev. 961, 980–85 (2017).
examples of algorithms replicating gender and racial 
biases abound throughout workplace hiring systems. 
Relatedly, various online personality tests, used heavily 
by employers in the low-wage workforce, inquire about 
or attempt to assess the applicant’s mental health, 
which in turn can result in disability discrimination.174 
While legal services lawyers generally do not handle 
employment discrimination cases, they may become 
aware of systemic problems within their client 
populations and be well situated to refer cases to civil 
rights attorneys.
In addition, legal services lawyers may work with 
clients who are struggling to obtain employment 
because employers are rejecting them owing to 
information in their digital profiles. Background checks 
typically include credit history, past employment, and 
information from public records, including criminal 
records. Background checks can include computer-
generated predictions based on unreliable information 
“...these technologies can  
replicate existing structural  
biases in society because they  
are trained on datasets that  
include the embedded biases of 
prior generations.”
Workers’ Rights
Poverty Lawgorithms Michele Gilman
Page 52
and questionable inferences. For instance, Upturn 
writes about a background check vendor that flags 
candidates it deems at risk of engaging in sexual 
harassment and other toxic workplace behavior 
based on social media posts and other public online 
content.175 According to a 2018 survey, 95% of 
employers are conducting background screening, 
and 94% of those include a form of criminal history 
check.176 There are approximately 2,000 background 
screening companies; the three largest conduct over 
50 million checks a year.177
Criminal background checks are deeply problematic 
given their unreliability and lack of proven connection 
to job performance. Between 70 and 100 million 
Americans have criminal records, which can serve 
as a barrier to employment. Errors can arise when 
background check companies do not update court 
records, thereby reporting expunged or dropped 
cases, or fail to state a case’s final disposition. In 
addition, the reports often contain data belonging to 
a different person; data that is over seven years old 
and thus banned under FCRA; and multiple versions 
of the same charges, giving the false impression of a 
lengthier criminal history. While applicants can review 
and correct their credit reports with the big three credit 
reporting agencies, that remedy is difficult to pursue 
for background checks, given that there are over 2,000 
background screening companies.178 
For all these reasons, as of 2019, 35 states and more 
than 150 cities and counties have enacted ban-the-box 
laws that forbid employers from asking about criminal 
175 Miranda Bogen & Aaron Rieke, Help Wanted:  An Examination of Hiring Algorithms, Equity, and Bias, Upturn 39 
(Dec. 2018).
176  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Market Snapshot: Background Screening Reports (Oct. 2019), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201909_cfpb_market-snapshot-background-screening_report.pdf.
177  Ariel Nelson, Fertile Ground for FCRA Claims: Employee & Tenant Background Checks, National Consumer Law 
Center (Dec. 16, 2019), https://library.nclc.org/fertile-ground-fcra-claims-employee-tenant-background-checks
178  Id. 
history until later in the hiring process, when there is 
greater opportunity for an individualized assessment.
As noted in the “Consumer Law” section of this report, 
FCRA applies to employers using consumer reports 
in employment decisions, as well as the companies 
that generate the reports (despite attempts by many 
data brokers to evade coverage). Employers must tell 
applicants they are conducting a background check, 
obtain written consent, provide a pre-adverse action 
notice with a copy of the consumer report and notice of 
rights under FCRA, and a final notice of rights once the 
denial is final. Individuals have the ability to challenge 
the content of the report, although as noted earlier, 
these processes can be time-consuming.
Some employers will access social media and court 
records themselves, without relying on an outside 
company. In these cases, FCRA does not apply, and 
remedies are few. However, a handful of states bar 
employers from accessing social media accounts.
●  EMPLOYEE MONITORING AND  
SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance and monitoring pervade the low-wage 
workplace. Employers routinely require personality and 
drug tests before hiring and throughout employment; 
they observe workers through video cameras, monitor 
computer keystrokes, listen to telephone calls, review 
emails and internet usage, and track movements 
through GPS or radio frequency devices. Employers use 
an array of algorithmic management tools “to remotely 
manage workforces, relying on data collection and 
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surveillance of workers to enable automated or semi-
automated decision-making.”179 Worker performance 
is quantified through continual data collection, which 
puts pressure on workers that can compromise their 
safety, increase their stress, and result in disciplinary 
actions.180 These surveillance and monitoring systems 
lack transparency, obscure power imbalances between 
employers and workers, and make it difficult for workers 
to negotiate for better conditions.181
Nevertheless, there are few legal protections against 
employer surveillance and monitoring tools. No federal 
law limits worker surveillance. Most states prohibit 
surveillance in highly intimate settings (such as locker 
rooms and bathrooms) but otherwise, employers have 
few restraints on watching their employees. Most 
employees are at-will, and employers can condition 
employment on consent to a variety of monitoring 
practices. Unionized workers are sometimes able 
to bargain for surveillance limits in their contracts, 
but only 10.3% of the workforce is unionized.182 
Regardless of union membership, the National Labor 
Relations Act protects employees who communicate, 
including on social media and in emails, about their 
working conditions. 
Other legal protections from surveillance are scattered 
and narrow and vary by state. For instance, some 
states prohibit employers from demanding access to 
179  Alexandra Mateescu & Aiha Nguyen, Explainer: Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, Data & Society (Feb. 6, 
2019), https://datasociety.net/library/explainer-workplace-monitoring-surveillance.
180  Julia Ticona, Alexandra Mateescu & Alex Rosenblat, Beyond Disruption: How Tech Shapes Labor Across 
Domestic Work & Ridehailing, Data & Society (June 2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/
Data_Society_Beyond_Disruption_FINAL.pdf.
181  Mateescu & Nguyen, supra note 179. 
182  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members 2019 (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
union2.pdf.
183  See David Weil, Lots of Employees Get Misclassified as Contractors. Here’s Why It Matters, Harv. Bus. Rev. 
(July 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/07/lots-of-employees-get-misclassified-as-contractors-heres-why-it-matters.
184  Veena B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on 
Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 Wis. L. Rev. 239 (2017).
employees’ social media, and some prohibit employers 
from tracking employees. Overall, the law provides little 
privacy protections for workers, but lawyers should 
be familiar with the available workplace protections in 
their jurisdiction and consider organizing and advocacy 
strategies to meet the privacy needs of workers.
● MISCLASSIFICATION
Related to wage theft is misclassification of workers as 
independent contractors rather than employees. When 
workers are misclassified as independent contractors, 
they can find themselves underpaid because they 
lack the overtime and minimum wage protections of 
employees. In addition, independent contractors do 
not receive employment benefits or antidiscrimination 
protections, they do not have the right to collectively 
bargain, and they are not covered by unemployment 
insurance, workers compensation, or occupational 
health and safety laws. Moreover, these employers 
and their workers do not contribute to social insurance 
programs and employment taxes, thus reducing funding 
overall.183 Technology has digitized the scourge of 
misclassification. Gig workers perform on-demand 
service work arranged over web-based platforms, such 
as “chauffeur driving, food and goods delivery, home 
cleaning, gardening, and errand-running.”184 A Federal 
Reserve study puts the number of gig workers at 75 
million. In addition to the lack of protections afforded 
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employees, gig workers also face the risk of being fined 
for breaching user agreements because they stand in 
the role of consumer vis-à-vis the internet platform on 
which they obtain work.
The law is still sorting through how to treat these 
workers. In general, the line between an employee and 
independent contractor hinges on the level of control 
the employer has over the worker—greater control 
is indicative of employment status. As Professor 
Veena Dubal states, “On the one hand, [gig] workers 
are encouraged to act entrepreneurially and through 
self-initiative to make money for themselves and the 
firm. On the other hand, many of these firms claim that 
software is their core competency, and thus workers 
performing tasks and services through the software 
have been ‘externalized’ as independent contractors.”185 
There have been numerous lawsuits challenging 
the classification of gig workers as independent 
contractors, but as Professor Miriam Cherry explains, 
“No clear consensus has emerged on how the courts 
will determine employee versus independent contractor 
status for workers in the on-demand economy. Many of 
the cases that might have provided important rulings 
have settled.”186
185  Id. at 75–51.
186  Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 
577 (2016). 
Lawmakers are also wading in to resolve the issue. 
Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, and other states have codified on-demand 
gig workers as independent contractors. By contrast, 
California passed a statute in 2019 that significantly 
reduces the ability of employers to classify gig workers 
as independent contractors, and other states, such 
as New Jersey, Illinois, and New York, are considering 
similar legislation. Uber, Lyft, and other platform 
businesses have announced that they will not comply 
with the California statute and intend to defend their 
position in litigation. They are also funding a ballot 
initiative to exempt them from the law. Suffice to 
say, classification issues for workers in the platform 
economy are an unsettled issue that will be disputed 
in coming years. Advocates for low-wage workers will 
need to stay abreast of these developments and use 
litigation and law reform strategies to ensure that 
workers whose employment terms are controlled by 
their employers are classified as employees.
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The United States has built a massive, technologically 
fueled immigration surveillance system that has 
expanded aggressively in recent years. The National 
Immigration Law Center explains, “Immigrants are 
caught in a complex and opaque web of databases, 
related systems, and information-sharing mechanisms 
that facilitate immigration enforcement and erect 
barriers to their full participation in economic and 
social life in the United States.”187 A full description 
of immigration surveillance and the legal tools to 
constrain these systems are outside the scope of 
this report and are available elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
this section provides a brief overview of immigration 
surveillance because legal services lawyers who 
represent immigrants on other civil matters should 
be aware of the ways in which their clients are being 
tracked for purposes of immigration enforcement.
Federal agencies are engaged in extensive data sharing 
with state and local law enforcement and licensing 
agencies. For example, a local police department 
can take fingerprints at the scene of an arrest and 
run them against FBI and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) databases, which in turn generate a 
187  Untangling the Immigration Enforcement Web: Basic Information for Advocates about Databases and 
Information-sharing Among Federal, State, and Local Agencies, National Imm. L. Ctr. (Sept. 2017), https://www.nilc.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Untangling-Immigration-Enforcement-Web-2017-09.pdf.
188  Face Recognition and Driver’s License Photo-Sharing, National Imm. L. Ctr. (Oct. 2019), https://www.nilc.org/
issues/drivers-licenses/face-recognition-and-dl-photo-sharing.
189  Joan Friedland, Information Vacuuming: The Trump Administration is Collecting Massive Amounts of Data 
for its Immigrant Surveillance and Deportation Machine, National Imm. L. Ctr. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nilc.
org/2018/08/22/information-vacuuming-immigrants-and-citizens.
190  Chinmayi Sharma, The National Vetting Enterprise: Artificial Intelligence and Immigration Enforcement, 
Lawfare (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/national-vetting-enterprise-artificial-intelligence-and-
immigration-enforcement.
notice to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
if there is a match so that ICE can arrange to have 
the person held until it can pick them up. The data 
matching goes both ways; ICE and the FBI have access 
to state and local criminal justice records, along with 
certain states’ facial recognition technology, which 
is typically generated from driver’s license records.188 
The federal government is also deploying automated 
license-plate readers to record license plates and 
track drivers’ movements and social media monitoring 
of visa applicants and immigrants, including legal 
permanent residents and naturalized citizens.189 In 
addition, ICE has contracts with private data brokers 
to conduct continuous monitoring of personal data, 
including credit history, utility records, cell phone 
accounts, driver’s license information, public court 
records, employment address data, and criminal 
records. Put together, “this amounts to a moment-by-
moment monitoring of immigrant activities during the 
lifecycle of their interactions with the United States, as 
opposed to the previous system of checkpoint-based 
immigration enforcement.”190
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While there are few legal limits on immigration 
surveillance, some states and jurisdictions are 
declaring themselves sanctuaries and resisting 
coordination with federal immigration enforcement 
efforts. Civil rights and immigration lawyers have used 
constitutional claims to fight back against surveillance 
that results in national origin profiling and raised Fourth 
Amendment defenses against warrantless searches. 
These are ongoing and urgent efforts. For civil legal 
services lawyers who do not practice immigration law, 
questions about immigration surveillance are likely to 
surface, such as the risks of an undocumented person 
filing a wage claim or housing court case. Accordingly, 
these issues may require coordination with and 
education from immigration lawyers within a specific 
jurisdiction to fully counsel clients about the risks and 
benefits of asserting various rights in civil forums.
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● CONCLUSION
Data-centric technologies impact everyone in 
the United States. However, the impacts can be 
particularly harmful to people without economic 
resources, who are disproportionately people of color. 
Every day, legal services lawyers assist low-income 
clients in meeting their basic needs, such as housing, 
food, education, employment, medical care, and family 
stability. This report suggests four broad lessons for 
these lawyers, who are on the frontlines in identifying 
and challenging emerging technologies that are 
adversely impacting clients.
First, low-income people and their lawyers must be at 
the table when governments are considering adopting 
automated decision-making systems and then remain 
engaged in ongoing oversight. Their insights can 
improve the accuracy and ethical use of these systems. 
Legal services lawyers and their clients also have a 
tremendous amount of information and experience to 
share with policymakers who are considering new laws 
related to data privacy and protection. It is essential 
that emerging laws protect the interests of all persons, 
not just those of elites and industry. Next, legal 
services lawyers need additional training and funding 
to understand and interrogate algorithmic systems 
and challenge them in court. This is the time for 
technologists working toward digital justice to join with 
legal services lawyers to share and build on each other’s 
expertise. Finally, many of the remedies suggested 
in this report are challenging for a high-volume legal 
services office to pursue; these offices must often 
triage their clients’ most urgent needs. The issues 
highlighted this report, then, are ideal for partnering 
with, or referrals to, law offices or pro bono lawyers 
who engage in impact litigation. In the fight for access 
to justice, poverty lawyers and their clients need to 
expand their toolbox—but the tools are within reach.
● ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was made possible with the generous time 
and insights of the following legal experts: Erica Braudy, 
New York Legal Services; Jordan Brensinger, Columbia 
University; David Brody, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights; Louise Carwell, Legal Aid Bureau of Maryland; 
Ana Cisneros Alvarez, Wage Justice Center; Catherine 
Cramer, Northeast Big Data Hub; Hilary Dalin, Office 
of Elder Justice and Protective Services; Sharon 
Dietrich, Community Legal Services of Philadelphia; 
Eric Dunn, National Housing Law Project; Elizabeth 
Edwards, National Health Law Program; Jennifer Egan, 
Maryland Office of the Public Defender; Professor 
Barbara Fedders, University of North Carolina School 
of Law; Alyssa Fieo, University of Baltimore School of 
Law; Stevie Glaberson, Public Justice; Cornelia Bright-
Gordon, Legal Aid Bureau of Maryland; Jon Greenbaum, 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights; Alex Gulotta, 
Komenge Law; Kevin de Liban, Legal Aid of Arkansas; 
Office of New York City Councilwoman Helen Rosenthal; 
Carla Leticia Sanchez-Adams, Texas RioGrande Legal 
Aid, Inc., Jeffrey Senter, Legal Aid Society, Harlem 
Community Law Office; Julia Simon-Mishel, Philadelphia 
Legal Assistance; Angela Tripp, Michigan Legal Help 
Program; David Udell, National Center for Access to 
Justice; Elizabeth Wells, Silicon Valley Legal Foundation; 
Judith Whiting, Community Service Society; Morgan 
Williams, National Fair Housing Alliance; and Chi Chi Wu, 
National Consumer Law Center. In addition, the clinical 
faculty at the University of Baltimore School of Law 
provided valuable feedback: Professors Katy Clemens, 
Daniel Hatcher, Margaret Johnson, Neha Lall, Jaime Lee, 
Hugh McClean, Nicole McConlogue, Nickole Miller,  
Jane Murphy, Colin Starger, Alexandra Smith, and  
Shanta Trivedi. Finally, a big thanks to the teams at Data 
& Society for supporting this work and helping make 
this report a reality.
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● RECOMMENDED READING LIST
The following books provide in-depth explorations of 
the mechanics and impact of data-centric technologies 
on low-income people, people of color, and other 
marginalized groups:
 ○ Ruha Benjamin, Race After Technology: Abolitionist Tools 
for the New Jim Code (2019) 
 ○ Meredith Broussard, Artificial Unintelligence: How 
Computers Misunderstand the World (2018) 
 ○ Sasha Costanza-Chock, Design Justice: Community-Led 
Practices to Build the Worlds We Need (2020) 
 ○ Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren F. Klein, Data Feminism 
(2020) 
 ○ Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech 
Tools Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor (2019) 
 ○ Safiya Umoja Noble, Algorithms of Oppression: How Search 
Engines Reinforce Racism (2018) 
 ○ Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data 
Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy (2016) 
 ○ Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society (2015) 
 ○ Alex Rosenblat, Uberland: How Algorithms Are Rewriting 
the Rules of Work (2018) 
 ○ Sara Wachter-Boettcher, Technically Wrong: Sexist Apps, 
Biased Algorithms, and Other Threats of Toxic Tech (2017)
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